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The present study- Part of a set of studies about the actors in the 
Albanian democracy
At the beginning of the year 2014 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung brought 
into life, together with leading experts of six distinguished organizations 
and Think Tanks, a long term project. The aim of this project is to create 
and stimulate a political and social discussion in Albania about the EU 
Integration.
A long-term Project in several stages
The starting point of the contemplation was the perspective that Albania 
desires to be soon a full EU member, with an economic and social 
developed society. More than 80% of the population aims at this goal. To 
reach it Albania must fulfil, inter alia, the minimum social standards of 
the EU ─ the so called European Social Model (ESM). These standards 
can only be reached if all involved parties of the society along with 
politics and administration act jointly, namely that they foster a 
trusting and cooperating relationship between each other. In order 
to become an EU member the requirements are high and can just be 
reached through the cooperation of all participating actors.
On this regard, the long-term project was planned in several stages. 
They should overlap in time to interweave results from the discussions 
of the actors with the project work. From this point of view the project 
stays dynamic and is co-designed by those who are participating in the 
discussions. Starting point ─ the first stage ─ was the assumption that 
a democratic, social and economic successful society can only develop 
if all actors act on the foundation of trust, democratically orientated and 
with the willingness to develop an active cooperation. If the cooperation 
occurs, the EU membership will be achieved easily. This is why all 
actors respectively were interviewed about their stands, engagement 
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and commitment the above mentioned principles and the other involved 
groups. In this manner three different studies were created.
The first stage: Studies about the main actors
The first study is based on a representative survey in the population, 
a fundamental actor for building up democratic relations. The 
second study is based on a survey with employees of the public 
administration in all levels of employment and in all regions - with 
the self-concept of the administration as a service provider for 
citizens and state. The third study enters uncharted territory. With 
the background knowledge that political parties are the backbone of 
democracy, members of all three main political parties represented 
in the parliament were interviewed regarding the present situation 
and about discussions within their parties. In spite of the fact that 
this survey cannot - because of self-evident reasons – base on 
representative data, nevertheless allows a clear view on the leading 
political protagonists.
The second stage: Potential for similarities and oppositions
The results of these studies are supposed to be seen in correlation 
with each other to shed light on potentials and shortcomings for a 
future interaction of these three main groups within democracy. In 
this discussion should be included the findings of the public debate 
during the first stage. To a certain extent a “Manual for Public 
Debate on Democracy in Albania” is supposed to be delivered. 
This working title hints that the working book delivers less answers 
and recommendations but rather poses questions and stimulates 
suggestions because the process between the actors is not limited by 
time. The process is a constantly dynamic one, where always new 
aspects come into play.
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The third stage: The public - lectures, debates and discussions
Public debates and information events - based on the first findings 
- complete the project work. These events take also place to 
continuously include new stimulations and findings in the project 
work. Altogether there will be debates in schools and universities as 
well as in the public media with representatives of all groups. Policy 
papers will equally contribute to the important political as well as 
social debate. 
This project path is already part of its objective: active involvement 
of all actors in one common discourse. It is not about finding 
quick solutions or just an exchange of statements, it rather aims at 
developing and building up reciprocal trust. Otherwise stated: this 
endeavour tries, with this genre of public debates, to ameliorate the 
rapport of actors - Politics, administration and citizens - and to 
be conducive for a more efficient cooperation in the organization 
of a social and democratic society.
The third stage is certainly organized in an open manner, time and 
content wise. The project is mainly activated by how far the named 
actors in this society are ready to get involved in the public with 
their claims and wishes, their visions and fears.
From this point of view, the project will accompany the Albanian 
politics for a little while on their way to the EU and will support them. 
An inevitable component of a democratic debate is that this does 
not always work smoothly. But one thing always got confirmed: the 
best friend of a positive development is a critical and constructive 
dialogue between the actors who have mutual respect for each other.
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1.  Introduction
The post-communist market economy euphoria marginalized 
the social dimension of the state despite the fact that citizens 
continued to see the state as a main provider of social services. 
The legacy of the paternalist relationship with the state and the 
feeling of entitlement towards free services such as education, 
health care, child care, etc., were especially present in post-
communist Albania throughout the transition period. While 
liberal democracy and market economy were seen as the main 
pillars of the organization of the state after communism, citizens’ 
mindset towards the state, public institutions, and social services 
did not changed as rapidly as the economic system did through 
the application of the shock therapy at the beginning of the 90s. 
Nevertheless, new research has shown that despite the fact that 
the communist legacy is important to citizens’ attitudes towards 
democracy, market economy and institutions in the transition 
period, the post-communist experience with institutions and 
their performance during this period has affected citizens’ 
attitudes as much as the communist legacy. Thus some would 
argue that citizens’ experience with the post-communist period 
has been as important in defining their political attitudes as the 
communist period, and institutions’ economic performance and 
success during transition has a positive correlation with citizens’ 
trust towards them.1 In the same variation spirit other scholars 
1. See William Mishler and Richard Rose. “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular 
Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies”.The 
Journal of Politics, 59: 2, (May 1997): 418-51. Also see: Grigore Pop-Elechesand 
Joshua A. Tucker. Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and 
Political Attitudes.(Paper prepared for presentation at the Center for the Study of 
Democratic Politics, Princeton University, May 9, 2012). Available at: http://www.
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would argue that the post-communist countries have not moved 
within the same tracks during transition given their different 
post-communist experiences. For example, Central and Eastern 
Europe countries ─ which were involved in the EU accession 
process in their early transition period ─ better accommodated 
citizens’ needs and requirements into a well-constructed welfare 
system compared to other countries in the region.
This two dimensional variation of the pre and post-communist 
period on the one side (temporal variation) and the cross-country 
variation during the post-communist period on the other side 
(spatial variation), makes generalizations very difficult while 
posing the necessity of a country-specific in-depth research. At 
the same time, the approaches presented above invite researchers 
to conduct more work into the post-communist period and 
the specific institutional designs that were present during the 
transition period which are accountable to a great extend for 
citizens’ attitudes.2
1.1. The importance of this survey
Given the above picture, with studies mainly conducted in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the post-soviet countries, this 
survey tries to map the general attitudes of Albanian citizens 
towards the state, its institutions, public services, the public 
versus private provision of services, as well as outlines citizens’ 
main attitudes towards the welfare state, social solidarity, the 
extent of the universal provision of services, etc. This survey is 
important for several reasons:
princeton.edu/csdp/events/Pop-Eleches05102012/Pop-Eleches05102012.pdf. 
2. See Linda J. Cook. Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform politics in Russia 
and Eastern Europe. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
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First, this survey adds to a very limited number of social surveys 
conducted in Albania. While a wide range of surveys have been 
conducted in the country, social surveys are less common. To 
be mentioned are Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust for 
the future and distrust for the present!, The state of Albanian 
democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections, as well as The 
European Social Survey (ESS)2013 conducted by OSF Albania. 
This survey will add to these existing ones as well as use them as 
a comparative asset when appropriate. 
Second, this survey goes beyond the existing efforts in 
comprehensively trying to adopt the main pillars of the European 
Social Model to a survey for the Albanian context. The European 
Social Model is defined in the European Commission’sWhite Paper 
on European Social Policy - A Way Forward for the Union of 1994, 
where the main pillars are defined as “democracy and individual 
rights, free collective bargaining, the market economy, equal 
opportunities for all, and social protection and solidarity.”3 The 
European Social Model is a unique combination meant “to give 
to the people of Europe the unique blend of economic well-being, 
social cohesiveness and high overall quality of life.”4 Thus, the 
European Social Model serves as the skeleton of this survey as it 
defines its main sections:
1. Democracy and market economy;
2. Trust; 
3. Collective bargaining and social dialogue; 
4. Public services and state size; 
3. Eurofund.European Social Model. (last updated: May 5, 2011). Available at: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/
europeansocialmodel.htm
4. European Commission.White Paper on European Social Policy - A Way 
Forward for the Union (COM (94) 333, Brussels, July 27, 1994),p. 1. Available 
at: http://aei.pitt.edu/1118/1/social_policy_white_paper_COM_94_333_A.pdf.
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5. Equal opportunities and social protection; 
6. Risk assessment.
Third, policymakers can find this survey helpful in the future 
when in need of social consensus over major social reforms or 
over the design of new social schemes. We already find social 
issues and especially discussions on the social welfare very 
relevant for Albania today in the light of the current economic 
hardship and of approaching new social problems like aging 
of the population. Especially with the start of negotiation for 
membership in the European Union in the near future, national 
consensus on reforms is going to be crucial. Some successful 
cases from Central and Eastern Europe show that incorporation 
of citizens’ needs, opinions and viewpoints when taking major 
steps forward with reforms is vital to successful reforms and the 
EU accession timing. 
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2. Executive Summary
How does the current institutional design affect citizens’ stands 
over issues of democracy, market economy, equal opportunities, 
social protection and solidarity? What are citizens’ views on 
the welfare state? What general principles are at the centre of 
citizens’ answers throughout the survey and how can they be 
generalized on a societal level? These are some general issues this 
executive summery will try to touch uponthrough reporting the 
main findings before moving on with methodology and detailed 
findings and analysis. Each of the sections of this survey has some 
key findings that are important to be mentioned and discussed 
more in detail. Moreover, there are some cross-sectional findings 
which are especially important to be underlined and discussed 
here. 
‘It is a partial democracy we live in’
The majority of the Albanians citizens we interviewed (72 
percent) believe that they live in a partial democracy, or what 
scholars have defined as a hybrid regime. Whether the answer is 
“Albania is more democratic than non democratic” or “Albania 
is more non democratic than democratic”, citizens perceive the 
level of democracy in the country as being somewhere in between 
democracy and non democracy. Nevertheless, it is important to 
notice that a bigger share of respondents (43 percent) believed 
that “Albania is more non democratic than democratic”. 
While in the 2013 survey5, a considerable share of answers fell on 
5. Alba Çela and Joana Kosho. The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 
general elections.Albanian Institute for International Studies (Tirana, 2013).Also 
see Chart 7 in the “Findings and Analysis” below where the 2013 answers have 
been reported for comparison reasons. 
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the two extremes of “Albania is a totally democratic country” or 
“Albania is a totally non democratic country” ─ with 34 percent 
of answers ─ this year, only 20 percent of answers fell on the 
two extremes while respondents tended to go more towards the 
centre where a not fully democratic country was indicated. This 
centripetal move is significant as citizens’ views shifted from 
the extreme edges of the ‘totally democratic’ versus ‘totally non 
democratic’ dichotomy to the more moderated ‘more democratic’ 
versus ‘more non democratic’ dichotomy. 
Albanian citizens’ perception of the regime/level of democracy 
looks consistent with the wide literature on hybrid regimes, 
which considerably relates the transition period with this form 
of regime.6 Nevertheless, the wider share of such a view in 2014 
compared to 2013 brings some other questions into discussion, 
mainly related to whether Albania is moving out of the 
transitional period, or whether the transition period is over, but 
these developments need more time to be reflected in citizens’ 
perceptions. If the second conclusion would be true, then the 
reported centralization of views is a positive development. 
Certainly, there is space for further research on these points. 
‘We want a market economy but not an economy 
led by the market’
Some very interesting views ─ sometimes contradictory too ─ 
are expressed in relation to the market economy and the way 
the Albanian economy should be designed and how it should 
function. From respondents’ answers to some questions on the 
market economy, the state intervention in economy, the states’ 
regulatory role in economy and the states’ minimal role in 
6.  For some views on Central and Eastern Europe see: Elisabeth Bakke and Ingo 
Peters (eds.). 20 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-
Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany. (Berlin: BWV 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2012). 
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economy, it is appropriate to say that citizens’ views are mostly 
trying to describe a mixed economy as the right economic system 
for Albania, at least in principle. Thus, Albanians seem supportive 
of an economy where the state is present to a considerable extent. 
Accordingly, when citizens’ were asked whether or not the 
market economy was the right economic system for Albania, 
the majority of respondents (65 percent) answered that it was. 
On the following question, when answering whether or not the 
state in Albania should intervene in economy in defining prices, 
protecting certain strategic businesses, etc, more than 2/3rd of 
the sample (71 percent) answered that the state should intervene. 
Furthermore, 84 percent of respondents answered that they agreed 
with the statement “the state in Albania should regulate economic 
relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc”. In order 
to confirm the general conclusion that Albanians would prefer in 
principle a mixed economy, the answer to the last question on the 
topic is also significant. Thus, a wide majority of respondents (77 
percent) did not agree with the statement “the state in Albania 
should intervene and be present as little as possible in economy 
as the market regulates itself”. 
‘These institutions are not worth our trust’
What is immediately noticeable in Albanians’ institutional trust 
level is their high distrust. While distrust in public institutions 
has been a widespread symptom of post-communist transition, 
institutional distrust is still a very persistent phenomenon in 
the Albanian society. The less distrusted institutions (the more 
trusted as a result) in the country ─ which scored low levels of 
distrust with fewer “none” and “a little” answers and high levels 
of trust with higher percentages of “some” and “a lot” answers ─ 
are public education institutions, private hospitals, police and the 
media. On the other extreme, the Central Election Commission, 
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the opposition and courts scored a very high level of distrust, 
while political parties are distrust outliers with 45 percent of 
respondents indicating that they have no trust in them. Public 
hospitals also scored very low in the trust level with 59 percent 
of respondents indicating “none” or “little” trust as an answer. 
When asked specifically on courts and their current status of 
justice delivery, citizens showed a low level of trust towards 
the judicial system in Albania. This was visible if looking at the 
fact that more than 60 percent of respondents agreed with the 
following statements: “citizens should have political connections 
in order to get a fair judgment”, “citizens should have personal 
connections in order to get a fair judgment”, and “citizens should 
pay bribes/corrupt judges/prosecutors in order to get a fair 
judgment”. At the same time, 76 percent of respondents did not 
agree with the statement “the judicial system in Albania gives 
fair decisions”.
‘We want a wide-sized state, despite our satisfaction with 
public services’ provision’
A consistent trend throughout the survey is respondents’ tendency 
to choose the state, public institutions and public funding as the 
preferred and the most desirable way to provide public services, 
despite the fact that apart from electricity, for all of the other 
services provided by the state and which were listed in our 
survey more than 50 percent of citizens indicated that they are 
“not satisfied” or “not very satisfied” with (see chart 25). When 
asked about who should be the main provider of some core public 
services, respondents were relatively consistent in their opinion 
that the state had to be the main provider. 
Thus, the state was the preferred provider starting from jobs with 
the lowest 66 percent of respondents’ answers indicating the 
state as the main provider, and then going to public safety with 
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91 percent of respondents’ answers indicating the state. For other 
services like justice, education, social protection, health care, 
infrastructure, electricity, water supply, post offices and housing 
the state was indicated as the main provider in between 66 and 91 
percent of respondents’ answers (chart 21). Furthermore (chart 
31), 70 percent to 90 percent of respondents answered that the 
state should ensure child care services, unemployment assistance, 
paid maternity leave, adequate health care and 91 percent 
answered that the state should ensure disability assistance. 
When specifically asked about education, health care and 
retirement fund (pensions) provision, the majority of respondents 
answered that education and health care in Albania should be 
“public and funded by general taxation”, while pensions should 
be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, 
but allowing those who choose to do so to devote part of the 
contributions to a private fund”.
Furthermore, public institutions are also indicated as better public 
services’ providers (Chart 26), with the exception of health care 
and employment promotion where the private sector is indicated 
as a better provider. 
Finally, while most of respondents (66 percent) indicate that 
privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing 
services, even more respondents (72 percent) think that not all 
state enterprises in Albania should be privatized. It looks like 
the preferred solution for citizens ─ with 70 percent of answers 
─ would be the application of a model where the state continues 
to be the owner of important enterprises while private companies 
are contracted only for the management part. 
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‘Services should be public7 although we are not sure if we 
are ready to pay more taxes’
Usually, from some of the western welfare models (Nordic 
model), it is the case that a higher quantity and quality of public 
services provisions by the state is coupled with a higher level of 
general taxation, especially income taxes. Although, as noticed 
above, Albanians are asking for an omnipresent state in relation 
to public services, they are undecided in relation to paying 
more in order to get better/wider services. Thus, 49 percent of 
respondents agreed that “the level of taxation should increase 
if this would bring to better services” against 51 percent that 
disagreed with the statement.
Despite the fact that respondents are undecided if they would 
pay more for better services, the majority (70 percent) agreed 
that “who earns more should pay more” and 62 percent disagreed 
that “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of 
incomes”. From respondents’ answers it could be concluded that 
citizens would prefer a progressive taxation in relation to the flat 
one and that the social gap is meant to be reduced by the higher 
payment/contribution of those who earn more. 
“The multi-actor decision-making on public services is 
desirable but not applied into practice”
7.  “Public” in this context refers to the universal access to services offered by the 
state. The difference “public” versus “private” in this study is done according to 
the general understanding in Albania – the provision of services by the state which 
are accessible by everyone versus the provision of services by a private entity 
which are accessible through a certain payment fee. This difference “public” 
versus “private” would not have any meaning in an Anglo-Saxon context where 
for example universities, hospitals, or kindergartens are considered public, despite 
the fact that access to these services is offered through a fee. Due to the limited 
space, this is certainly a very simplified explanation of a complex phenomenon 
and understanding of these terms in different societies.  
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How should decisions on public services be taken and by whom? 
In relation to decision-making actors, citizens see the state as 
an important decision-maker but not the only one. They see the 
community and trade unions as similarly important and legitimate 
actors in discussing important issues on public services as well 
as on taking decisions over them. In few words, citizens see a 
collaborativemulti-actor decision-making on public services as 
the optimal model. 
Asked on whose responsibility should decision-making on 
public services management and priorities be, more than half of 
respondents (58 percent) answered that such decisions should 
be taken by “both experts/policymakers and the general public 
or community groups which benefit and contribute to these 
services”. From the rest of respondents, 1/4th answered that 
the “community and the general public should be much more 
involved in shaping these services while indicating priorities to 
policymakers”.
Furthermore, when people were asked on who should be 
responsible for taking important decisions on wages, working 
hours and workers’ rights in Albania, a wide majority of 
respondents (61 percent) answered that the “government and 
policymakers in collaboration with the trade unions” should be 
responsible for this. Furthermore, 1/5th of respondents answered 
that these decisions should be “mainly discussed and decided 
by trade unions while the government and policymakers are 
the endpoint of the process or the receiving end”. Only 12 
percent answered that these decisions should be “exclusively 
discussed and decided by public institutions, the government and 
policymakers”. 
Despite these views on the optimal process, the majority of 
citizens feel like having little or no influence in decision-making 
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on a national and/or local level. Thus, 80 percent of respondents 
answered that they have “little” or “no influence” over the local 
level decision-making process and 89 percent answered in the 
same way over the national level decision-making process. In 
the same way, trade unions’ activity in Albania is generally 
unknown by citizens ─ a detail that tells a lot about their low 
public engagement. Thus, 86 percent of respondents were not 
able to agree or disagree with the statement that trade unions 
today are “active and effective in supporting workers’ rights”.
“We want a fairer and more solidar society”
Judging from this survey, it looks like the majority of Albanian 
citizens wants to live in a society that provides considerable 
social protection and that is lead by solidarity. This was first 
visible when respondents were asked to define a fair society and 
they were mainly divided between two statements: that in a fair 
society “who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged 
segments of society should be assisted by the state” and “no 
one is left without basic public services despite their ability to 
contribute” ─ with both of the statements being indicated by 36 
percent of respondents each. 
Furthermore, when asked specifically on the unemployment 
assistance in Albania, a large majority of respondents (83 
percent) answered that the current allocated sum per household 
was too small. The other two options ─ where the unemployment 
assistance is stated as high or as about right ─ got some insignificant 
indication percentages compared to the above option.
We previously underlined the fact that Albanian citizens are 
very keen on having an active and wide-sized state that takes 
care of many aspects of citizens’ lives. Continuing on the same 
major theme, the majority of respondents (from 72 percent to 91 
percent) also want the state to be active in providing services 
Towards a redefinition of the social contract
21
to disabled and disadvantaged people, working parents, poor 
families, retired people, etc. Moreover, 43 percent of respondents 
think that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution 
role in lowering the rich-poor gap” and 35 percent think that 
it should “moderately engage in redistribution policies”. Only 
12 percent of respondents think that “the rich poor gap is not a 
matter the state should be dealing with”.
‘We all have similar problems’
Another present theme in the survey ─ especially visible from 
the last survey section on risk assessment ─ is the fact that 
respondents perceive their current major problems to be similar 
to the problems that they think other fellow Albanian citizens 
have. Accordingly, when indicating what respondents considered 
to be a problem for Albanian citizens today, the most indicated 
values where unemployment, poverty and poor standards of 
justice. Similarly, when asked about what their most concerning 
personal issue was, the majority of answers indicated low 
economic income, unemployment and poverty. Judging from the 
symmetry of these answers, we could probably conclude that 
there is a certain social cohesion in terms of what citizens see as 
commonly problematic or as unifying element in their everyday 
life. 
There is no clear left-right ideological division in Albania
While people in Albania would identify themselves as belonging 
to the left wing or the right wing in relation to the party they are 
affiliated with, in terms of ideology it looks like there is no clear 
division or belonging in Albania. From the cross-tabulations 
presented in Chapter 4 one can notice that in relation to classical 
ideologically sensitive question on the state, the economy or the 
welfare system, answers do not meet expectations in relation to 
the ideological profile. While the left wing group respondents and 
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the central and central right group respondents tend to be more 
consistent with their ideological profiles’ traditional stands, those 
that identify as the right wing group are the most inconsistent in 
their answers with the expectations one would have judging from 
their identification as belonging to a right wing ideology. 
The income level is important in defining part of citizens’ 
stances
Throughout the survey we noticed that the income level was 
usually more important than the ideological profile in defining 
respondents’ answers. Thus, when people were asked in 
relation to state intervention in economy, models of decision-
making, public versus private management of education, health, 
retirement income, taxation and privatization, income looked 
as an important variable that affected respondents’ answers. 
Although we cannot claim any causation at this point ─ as it will 
be visible for the cross-tabulations present throughout Chapter 
4 ─ there is a certain level of correlation between incomes and 
respondents’ answers in relation to certain questions.
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3. Methodology and respondents’ profile
3.1. Methodology and sampling
This survey had a sample of 1200 respondents and aimed at 
having a large variety of respondents’ profiles in terms of gender, 
age, education level, employment status as well as incomes and 
ideological profiles; although some of these characteristics could 
not be pre-determined since the selection of respondents was 
random with prior quota sampling according to the population 
size of the 12 administrative regions of Albania. The survey was 
conducted with structured interviews during May-June 2014 
in the biggest urban areas of the 12 administrative regions of 
Albania.8
This specific crosscut of the population is helpful in exploring 
some main patterns of peoples’ perceptions and expectations in 
relation to democracy, the market economy, public and private 
institutions and the social welfare in Albania. Accordingly, with 
such a wide range of data on an extended vertical and horizontal 
sample of the population, the analysis will be able to explore 
the possible variations of citizens’ stances in relation to specific 
variables, such as income level and ideological profile. 
As mentioned in the introduction part, the conceptualization of 
the survey sections has been done in accordance with the main 
pillars of the European Social Model. The last chapter on risk 
assessment has been left intentionally as a concluding section in 
order for policymakers and future surveys to follow up from there 
as a starting point to conduct further research or design policies. 
In terms of the specific questions asked, the survey has borrowed 
8.  See Appendix 1 for the survey template. 
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the conceptual framework of the questions from well-known 
social surveys with the necessary adaptations to meet the Albanian 
context. An important source was the European Social Survey,9 
the Spanish Center for Sociological Research (CIS),10 2020 
Public Services Trust,11 as well as question asked in previous 
surveys, especially those on trust and risk assessment.
With such a representative sample, although throughout the 
findings and analysis the report refers to the sample and to the 
respondents, we are statistically able to generalize for a wider 
population and refer to Albanian citizens. 
3.2. Profile of respondents
As showed in the figures below (chart 1 and 2), the sample of this 
survey is composed of 52 percent female respondents against 48 
percent male.12 The age sampling varies from 18-29 years of age 
to over 70 years of age. The colorful composition of the age pie 
chart shows that the age groups were also balanced in the sample 
with two major groups being the 18-29 years of age (38 percent) 
and 30-39 years of age (24 percent). It is visible that the sample 
9. European Social Survey. Data and Documentation. (2014). See: http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/data/. A survey example available here: http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/fieldwork/source/ESS6_source_main_
questionnaire.pdf.
10. See Inés Calzada and EloísadelPino. Perceived efficacy and citizens’ attitudes 
toward welfare state reform. International Review of Administrative Sciences. 
Volume 74:4. (2008).
11. 2020 Public Services Trust at RSA.What do people want, need and expect 
from public services? (2010). Available at: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/
DownloadPublication/1345_sri_what_do_people_want_need_and_expect_
from_public_services_110310.pdf. 
12. Note on percentage values: Throughout the survey values have been rounded 
up, thus no digit was left after the decimal point. 
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age was relatively young with almost 80 percent of the sample 
being below 50 years of age. 
            Chart 1                                            Chart 2
While gender and age are important variables in getting a 
general picture of the respondents’ profile, the education level 
and employment status are some further variables that better 
help us in detailing people’s stances in a social survey. These 
are variables that could potentially determine people’s choices in 
the survey questions, given the fact that both the education level 
and the employment status ─ separately or combined ─ affect 
or determine people’s values and their view on social, economic 
and political issues.
In terms of education the sample has a relatively wide group 
of university educated respondents which comprise 40 percent 
of the sample. This is followed by 35 percent of high school 
educated people and 13 percent of master or doctoral level 
educated people. 
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Chart 3
In terms of employment status, more than half of the sample 
is composed of employed respondents, while 19 percent are 
students, 16 percent are unemployed and 9 percent are retired/
pensioners. 
Chart 4
As the literature on social welfare in general and on social welfare 
in post-communist countries in particular shows,13 the level of 
incomes is a major variable in defining people’s perceptions, 
expectations and stands in relation to public institutions, the 
13. See Richard Rose and Toni Makkai. “Consensus or dissensus about welfare in 
post-communist societies?”, European Journal of Political Research, Volume 28: 
2, (September 1995): 203–224.
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role of the state in economy, the profile of a fair society, etc. 
Thus, this variable, along with the ideological profile, becomes 
very important in analyzing respondents’ answers throughout the 
survey. 
The ideological profile is assumed to be compatible with the 
economic and social status, a status which in our survey could 
be partially coupled or represented by the level of incomes. The 
wide literature on post-communist political attitudes and social 
cleavages generally underlined the fact that left-right spectrum 
citizens’ self-placement in these countries was not defined in 
accordance to their level of incomes as it is assumed from a 
Western society tradition.14 Despite these views, according to 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker,15 people in post-communist societies 
in these last years, tend to define themselves increasingly in the 
left-right spectrum (the so called left-right self-placement) in 
accordance to their economic profiles, thus incomes. 
In relation to the household level of incomes,16 it is visible that 
more than half of respondents (60 percent) claimed that their 
aggregated household level of incomes per month was below or 
equal to 60 thousand Lekë. Furthermore, 34 percent claimed a 
household level of income in between 60 thousand  Lekë and 160 
thousand Lekë, while only 4 percent claimed to have a household 
14. Hulda Thorisdottir, John T. Jost, IdoLiviatan and PatrickeShrout. 
“Psychological Needs and Values Underlying Left-Right Political Orientation: 
Cross-National Evidence from Western and Eastern Europe.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 71:2 (2007): 175-203.
15. Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker. Communist Socialization 
and Post-Communist Economic and Political Attitudes.(Paper prepared for 
presentation at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton 
University, May 9, 2012). Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/
Pop-Eleches05102012/Pop-Eleches05102012.pdf.
16.  We take into consideration the fact that in similar surveys respondents are not 
always declaring their exact income level. 
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level of incomes that exceeded 160 thousand Lekë. 
Chart 517
When it comes to the left-right self-placement, a considerable 
amount of respondents (26 percent) did not define themselves 
in ideological terms, stating that they belonged to none of the 
categories of the ideological spectrum. Furthermore, 9 percent of 
respondents choose not to give an answer to this specific question. 
If these two categories are combined, then there is no left-right 
placement info about more then 1/3rd of the sample (35 percent). 
This aside, respondents were spread throughout the spectrum in a 
considerable way. Accordingly, the main categories were the left 
with 23 percent and the right with 15 percent. If the respective 
centres are taken into consideration then the left comprises of 
1/3rd of the sample (33 percent) and the right comprises of almost 
1/4th of the sample (23 percent). 
17. Note on incomes: Why were people asked about their household incomes 
and not their personal incomes? The household level of income is perceived to 
be as important as the personal income in the post-communist countries literature 
and especially more conservative societies as the family is very supportive of its 
members. This brings about the other problem of number of family members, but 
we believe from previous surveys that the size of the nucleus family in Albania, 
especially in urban zones, does not vary considerably.
 16
pikëpamjeve, sipas Pop-Eleches dhe Tucker,15 njerëzit në shoqëritë post-komuniste, gjatë 
këtyre viteve të fundit, priret ta identifikojnë veten gjithnjë e më tepër në spektrin ideologjik 
(i ashtuquajturi vetë-identifikim në spektrin e majtë-e djathtë) në varësi të profilit të tyre 
ekonomik, pra të ardhurave.  
Në lidhje me nivelin e të ardhurave familjare,16 është e dukshme se më shumë se gjysma e të 
anketuarve (60 përqind) deklarojnë se niveli i agreguar i të ardhurave të tyre familjare në 
muaj është më i vogël ose i barabartë me 60 mijë Lekë. Për më tepër, 34 përqind deklaruan 
një nivel të ardhurash midis 60 mijë dhe 160 mijë Lekë në muaj, ndërkohë që 4 përqind 
deklaruan se të ardhurat e tyre familjare i kalojnë 160 mijë Lekë.  
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Kur vijmë tek vetë-identifikimi në spektrin ideologjik, një numër i konsiderueshëm i të 
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anketuarit e tjerë ishin të shpërndarë në spektrin politik në mënyrë të konsiderueshme. 
Kështu, kategoritë kryesore ishin e majta me 23 përqind dhe e djathta me 15 përqind. Nëse 
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(23 përqind).  
                                                 
15Grigore Pop-Eleches dhe Joshua A. Tucker.Communist Socialization and Post-Communist Economic and 
Political Attitudes.(Paper prepared for presentation at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, 
Princeton University, May 9, 2012).http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Pop-Eleches05102012/Pop-
Eleches05102012.pdf. 
16 Marrim parasysh faktin që në sondazhe të tilla, të anketuarit jo gjithmonë e deklarojnë të saktë nivelin e të 
ardhurave.  
17Shënim mbi të ardhurat: Pse njerëzit u pyetën mbi të ardhurat familjare dhe jo ato personale? Niveli personal 
it të ardhurave mendohet të jetë po aq i rëndësishëm sa niveli familjar i të ardhurave në literaturën për shoqëritë 
post-komuniste, e sidmos ato më konservatore ku familja është mbështetësja kryesore e pjesëtarëve të saj. Kjo 
sjell në focus problemin tjetër të numrit të pjesëtarëve të familjes, por duke u nisur nga pyetësorë të mëparshëm 
mendojmë se numri i pje ëtarëve në familje  bërthamë në Shqipëri, sidomos në zonat rbane, nuk varion në 
mënyrë të konsiderueshme. 
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Chart 6
3.3. Cross-tabulations and variation
Throughout the analysis of the findings in the next chapter we 
have conducted cross-tabulations of variables in order to see 
how the profile of respondents’ affected their answers and stands 
on important issues. During the analysis we were especially 
interested in looking at the variation of answers in relation to 
respondents’ incomes and their ideological profiles. As it was 
previously mentioned, when looking at the literature, these two 
variables tend to affect respondents’ views on the role of the 
state in economy, redistribution policies, the welfare state and 
its’ characteristics, etc. In the next chapter, these results will be 
reported after those questions where important variation in terms 
of income and ideological profile is present. 
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4. Findings and analysis
This chapter is organized in six subchapters that represent the 
six main sections of the survey questionnaire, respectively: 
(1) Democracy and market economy; (2) Trust; (3) Collective 
bargaining and social dialogue; (4) Public services and state 
size; (5) Equal opportunities and social protection; and (6) Risk 
assessment. The questions that fall into these general categories 
aim at presenting a relatively detailed picture of the state of the 
welfare system in Albania, public services and state size, as well 
as citizens’ expectations and stands in relation to them. 
At the same time, throughout the subchapters, the variation of 
answers in relation to income and ideological profile will be 
reported and analyzed. Cross-tabulation of variables will be 
showed and discussed in relation to those questions where a 
significant variation in terms of income and/or ideological profile 
has been noticed. 
Throughout the analysis, in some cases there will be a comparison 
with two previous surveys: Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust 
and distrust for the future and The state of Albanian democracy 
at the eve of 2013 general elections; where few of this survey 
questions or similar ones were asked, although none of these 
previous surveys was similar in profile and aims to this one. 
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Section I: DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY
This section serves to outline citizens’ major stances and principles 
on the current state of democracy and the market economy as 
well as rule of law and citizens’ perception of their influence 
in decision-making in Albania. While democracy as such is 
not questioned in detail, except for the first question, general 
principles on market economy serve as important introduction 
questions of the survey in order to define respondents’ general 
views, believes and political principles in relation to the state 
and its role in economy. Nevertheless, citizens’ answers about the 
decision-making responsibility over public services’ distribution 
and management and about the level of influence they have over 
decision-making on a national and local lever is a good indicator 
to measure in general terms the degree of perceived participatory 
democracy among respondents. 
On an important question, but also a worm-up question to this 
survey, on the level of democracy in the country, respondents were 
divided mainly in between the opinions that “Albania is more 
non democratic than democratic”, with 43 percent, and “Albania 
is more democratic than non democratic”, with 29 percent. As 
it can be seen from the chart 7 below, the 2014 values from this 
survey are comparable with the 2013 values from The state of 
Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general elections.18
What is important to be noted in this case is that while the share 
of those indicating that “Albania is a totally non democratic 
country” fell by 10 percent from 2013 to 2014, the share of 
those indicating that “Albania is more non democratic than 
democratic” rose by 7 percent. In the same way, while the share 
18.  Alba Çela and Joana Kosho, 2013: 33. 
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of those indicating that “Albania is a totally democratic 
country” fell by 4 percent, the share of those indicating that 
“Albania is more democratic than non democratic” rose by 8 
percent. Thus, in 2014 there is a clear shift towards the middle 
moderated values of ‘partial democracy’ with 72 percent of 
the answers falling into this category, against 57 percent of the 
previous year. Thus, a centripetal move is present in citizens 
views which tend to move from the extreme edges of radical 
views towards a more moderated and complex view of the 
political system in Albania. 
Chart 7
When people were asked whether or not the market economy 
was the right economic system for Albania, the majority of 
respondents, 65 percent, answered that it was. Nevertheless, 
around 1/5th of the sample (21 percent) thought the opposite 
was the case. While as a general principle for a post-communist 
country this looks like a common answer pie, the two following 
questions ─ which can also serve as testing questions for this 
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18 Alba Çela and Joana Kosho, 2013: 33.  
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one ─ show a more complicated picture of citizens’ stands and 
perceptions in Albania. 
Chart 8
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
While the above chart gives the general picture of citizens’ 
answers, chart 8.1 helps to better understand the variation of 
respondents’ answers in relation to their household incomes. The 
chart shows that respondents with higher incomes tend to agree 
more that the market economy is the right economic system 
for Albania, although no clear correlation can be noticed here. 
Thus, when moving from the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range to 
‘100.000-160.000 Lekë’ respondents tend to increasingly agree 
with the statement that the market economy is the right economic 
system for Albania (the percentage changes gradually from 53 to 
82 percent). Until here the correlation is strong. The pattern is not 
complete as the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents 
do not follow the previous trend. 
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If we look at respondents’ ideological profile and their answers to the same question, there is 
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If we look at respondents’ ideological profile and their answers 
to the same question, there is no ideological clear division in 
relation to this question. From the chart below, ‘central right’ 
respondents seem like representing the far right, while ‘centre’ 
and ‘central left’ respondents support market economy more than 
those respondents that identify themselves as ‘right’ (74 percent 
and 75 percent against 67 percent). 
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State intervention in economy ─ although this can be done on 
different degrees and by following different models of state 
intervention ─ is generally considered a very different economic 
principle compared to the market economy. In answering whether 
or not the state in Albania should intervene in economy in 
defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc, more 
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way the statement has been formulated: “the state in Albania sho ld intervene in e onomy in
defining prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc”, can still sound as moderated 
capitalism to a post-communist society. This would be the case if taking into consideration 
the fact that the opposite of market economy in Albania would be a system that resembles a 
totally state-owned and state-controlled economy similar to the communist period in the 
country. Accordingly, state intervention in economy, with some specifications on the 
specific field, is probably perceived as a mixed economy by the majority of citizens. Thus, 
this is seen as a desirable option.   
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than 2/3rd of the sample answered that the state should intervene 
and only 29 percent answered that it should not. If compared 
with the previous question in relation to the market economy, 
the answer would not be very consistent. Nevertheless, the way 
the statement has been formulated: “the state in Albania should 
intervene in economy in defining prices, protecting certain 
strategic businesses, etc”, can still sound as moderated capitalism 
to a post-communist society. This would be the case if taking into 
consideration the fact that the opposite of market economy in 
Albania would be a system that resembles a totally state-owned 
and state-controlled economy similar to the communist period 
in the country. Accordingly, state intervention in economy, with 
some specifications on the specific field, is probably perceived as 
a mixed economy by the majority of citizens. Thus, this is seen as 
a desirable option.  
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income or ideological profile, differently from what one could 
expect in this specific case. This is visible from chart 9.1 and 9.2. 
Chart 9.1
Chart 9.2
The statement “the state in Albania should regulate economic 
relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc” was meant 
to define a regulatory role of the state in economy, thus a mixed 
economy. While we believe that the previous question was 
also probably perceived within the same framework of mixed 
economy, this statement looks like the most popular among the 
survey respondents. Accordingly, 84 percent of respondents 
answered that they agreed with the statement and only 16 percent 
believed the opposite was the case. 
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Chart 10
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
In answering whether or not “the state in Albania should regulate 
economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc” 
a certain variation in terms of income was noticed. Thus, while 
87 percent of those indicating ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ as their income 
agreed with the statement, this percentage gradually diminished 
with the rise of the level of household incomes until reaching 
76 percent in the case of those indicating ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ 
as their income level. Nevertheless, this is not a significant 
variation as respondents of all income levels generally agreed 
with the statement.  
Chart 10.1
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In answering whether or not “the state in Albania should regulate economic relations, 
general rules on competition and trade, etc” a certain variation in terms of income was 
noticed. Thus, while 87 percent of those indicating ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ as their income agreed 
with the statement, this percentage gradually diminished with the rise of the level of 
household incomes until reaching 76 percent in the case of those indicating ‘over 160.000 
Lekë’ as their income level. Nevertheless, this is not a significant variation as respondents of 
all income levels generally agreed with the statement.   
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When it comes to the ideological profile, the same pattern is noticed as in previous question: 
while the variation relatively meets expectations when moving from the ‘left’ wing group to 
the ‘central right’ group, the pattern is “broken” when reaching the ‘right’ wing group with 
81 percent of them agreeing with the statement that “the state in Albania should regulate 
economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc”.  
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“the state in Albania should not take part in economy as the market regulates itself”. A wide 
majority of respondents (77 percent) did not agree with the statement while only 23 percent 
thought this should be the case. The answer to this question is consistent with respondents’ 
stances on the previous two questions on the degree of state intervention in economy.  
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When it comes to the ideological profile, the same pattern is noticed as 
in previous question: while the variation relatively meets expectations 
when moving from the ‘left’ wing group to the ‘central right’ group, the 
pattern is “broken” when reaching the ‘right’ wing group with 81 percent 
of them agreeing with the statement that “the state in Albania should 
regulate economic relations, general rules on competition and trade, etc”. 
Chart 10.2
The final statement on the economy within the same category of 
questions, asked if whether “the state in Albania should not take 
part in economy as the market regulates itself”. A wide majority 
of respondents (77 percent) did not agree with the statement while 
only 23 percent thought this should be the case. The answer to this 
question is consistent with respondents’ stances on the previous 
two questions on the degree of state intervention in economy.
Chart 11
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Chart 11 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
As there was no significant variation in terms of income in relation to respondents’ answers 
to whether or not “the state in Albania should not take part in economy as the market 
regulates itself”, a more important pattern is noticed in relation to the ideological profile. In 
the same continues pattern as in previous questions, it is visible from chart 11.1 that there is 
a variation in terms of ideological profile when moving from the left wing group to the 
central right group of the political spectrum, but the pattern is “broken” again when it comes 
to the unexpected stances of the majority of the right wing group with 76 percent of them 
disagreeing with the statement. The central right wing group is again more rightist than the 
right wing group when it comes to stance on the market economy and the role of the state in 
economy.  
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If looking at the overall picture of answers to the above four statements, it is visible that the 
majority of respondents tend to be supportive of a mixed economy of some kind where the 
state does play a role, despite the different opinions on the extent of this role. Furthermore, 
throughout the above questions there is no variation in terms of the level of income and a 
weak variation in terms of ideological profile with especially not ideologically compatible 
answer from those that are self-placed in the right wing group.  
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Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
As there was no significant variation in terms of income in 
relation to respondents’ answers to whether or not “the state in 
Albania should not take part in economy as the market regulates 
itself”, a more important pattern is noticed in relation to the 
ideological profile. In the same continues pattern as in previous 
questions, it is visible from chart 11.1 that there is a variation 
in terms of ideological profile when moving from the left wing 
group to the central right group of the political spectrum, but 
the pattern is “broken” again when it comes to the unexpected 
stances of the majority of the right wing group with 76 percent 
of them disagreeing with the statement. The central right wing 
group is again more rightist than the right wing group when it 
comes to stance on the market economy and the role of the state 
in economy. 
Chart 11.1
If looking at the overall picture of answers to the above four 
statements, it is visible that the majority of respondents tend to 
be supportive of a mixed economy of some kind where the state 
does play a role, despite the different opinions on the extent of 
this role. Furthermore, throughout the above questions there is 
no variation in terms of the level of income and a weak variation 
in terms of ideological profile with especially not ideologically 
compatible answer from those that are self-placed in the right 
wing group. 
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Another question on this section was related to the decision-
making on public services management and priority setting. 
Asked on whose responsibility should decision-making on 
public services management and priorities be, more than half of 
respondents (58 percent) answered that such decisions should be 
taken by “both experts/policymakers and the general public or 
community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. 
From the rest of respondents, 1/4th answered that the “community 
and the general public should be much more involved in shaping 
these services while indicating priorities to policymakers” and 
the remaining 18 percent believed that these decisions were to be 
trusted to experts as they were more knowledgeable about these 
issues. 
Chart 12
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
It is interesting to see that there is considerable variation in 
terms of respondents’ income level when it comes to indicating 
the responsible actors that should make decisions on public 
services. Thus, it looks like the higher the incomes the more 
people tend to indicate that decisions on public services should 
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answered that such decisions should be taken by “both experts/policymakers and the general 
public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. From the rest 
of respondents, 1/4th answered that the “community and the general public should be much 
more involved in shaping these services while indicating priorities to policymakers” and the 
remaining 18 percent believed that these decisions were to be trusted to experts as they were 
more knowledgeable about these issues.  
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level when it comes to indicating the responsible actors that should make decisions on 
public services. Thus, it looks like the higher the incomes the more people tend to indicate 
that decisions on public services should be responsibility of “both experts/policymakers and 
t e general public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these services”. 
Thus, as it can be seen from chart 12.1, 51 percent of people that belong to ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ 
category indicated this option against 80 percent of those that belong to the ‘over 160.000 
Lekë’ income category. Obviously, the opposite pattern is true for the other two options of 
exclusivity for community groups or experts in taking decisions on public services ─ as with 
the increase of incomes, people tend to choose these two options less.  
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be responsibility of “both experts/policymakers and the general 
public or community groups which benefit and contribute to these 
services”. Thus, as it can be seen from chart 12.1, 51 percent 
of people that belong to ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ category indicated 
this option against 80 percent of those that belong to the ‘over 
160.000 Lekë’ income category. Obviously, the opposite pattern 
is true for the other two options of exclusivity for community 
groups or experts in taking decisions on public services ─ as 
with the increase of incomes, people tend to choose these two 
options less. 
Chart 12.1
After answering a question on the share of responsibility among 
public official and the community in relation to decision-making 
on public services, people were asked about their personal 
engagement and degree of influence over decision-making on 
the national and the local level. While to the previous question 
more than half of respondents answered that decisions on 
public services should be the responsibility of “both experts/
policymakers and the general public or community groups which 
benefit and contribute for these services”, to the current question 
a similar amount of respondents answered that they have no 
influence over decision-making at the local or national level. 
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local level. While to the previous question more than half of respondents answered that 
decisions on public services should be the responsibility of “both experts/policymakers and 
the eneral public or community groups which be efit and contribute for these serv ces”, to 
the current question a similar amount of respondents answered that they have no influence 
over decision-making at the local or national level.  
Thus, 47 p rcent of resp ndents answer d that they have no in luence over shaping 
decisions about public services on a local level and 64 percent answered that they have no 
influence over shaping decisions on public services on the national level. If the answer ‘no 
influence’ is combined with the answer ‘little influence’, then 80 percent of respondents 
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Thus, 47 percent of respondents answered that they have no 
influence over shaping decisions about public services on a 
local level and 64 percent answered that they have no influence 
over shaping decisions on public services on the national level. 
If the answer ‘no influence’ is combined with the answer ‘little 
influence’, then 80 percent of respondents answered that they 
have little or no influence over the local level decision-making 
process and 89 percent answered that they have little or no 
influence over the national level decision-making process. 
When comparing respondents’ answers in relation to the local 
and the national level, it is understandable why on the local 
level citizens’ believe they influence decision-making slightly 
more (11 percent more citizens indicated they have ‘some’ or ‘a 
lot’ of influence at the local level decision-making compared to 
the national level).  
Chart 13
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Chart 13 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
From chart 13.1 it is visible that with the increase of incomes respondents tend to believe 
that they have more influence in decision-making at the local level. Thus when moving from 
‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range, the percentage of those that indicate 
they have ‘a lot’ of influence increases from 2 percent to 10 percent. Similarly, the 
percentage of those that indicate ‘some’ influence varies from 13 percent to 22 percent. 
Nevertheless, we cannot see a clear correlation between income and the perceived influence 
over decision-making at the local level, given the fact that ‘little’ and ‘none’ alternatives are 
also affected by income level until a certain point (moving from 55 percent to 37 percent for 
‘none’ for example), but the pattern is not complete when the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income 
level is reached.  
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When it comes to respondents ideological profile and their answers to the same question, it 
is visible from chart 13.2 that no significant variation is noticed, although those that define 
themselves as ‘central’ in the political spectrum tend to generally indicate higher levels of 
influence compared to those that define themselves as belonging to ‘left’ or ‘right’.  
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Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
From chart 13.1 it is visible that with the increase of incomes 
respondents tend to believe that they have more influence in 
decision-making at the local level. Thus when moving from ‘0-
30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range, the percentage 
of those that indicate they have ‘a lot’ of influence increases from 
2 percent to 10 percent. Similarly, the percentage of those that 
indicate ‘some’ influence varies from 13 percent to 22 percent. 
Nevertheless, we cannot see a clear correlation between income 
and the perceived influence over decision-making at the local 
level, given the fact that ‘little’ and ‘none’ alternatives are also 
affected by income level until a certain point (moving from 55 
percent to 37 percent for ‘none’ for example), but the pattern 
is not complete when the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income level is 
reached. 
Chart 13.1
When it comes to respondents ideological profile and their 
answers to the same question, it is visible from chart 13.2 that 
no significant variation is noticed, although those that define 
themselves as ‘central’ in the political spectrum tend to generally 
indicate higher levels of influence compared to those that define 
themselves as belonging to ‘left’ or ‘right’. 
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Chart 13.2
In relation to citizens’ perceived influence in decision-making at the 
national level, from the chart below (chart 13.3), it is visible that there 
is some interesting variation in terms of the level of incomes. Thus 
when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income 
range, the percentage of those that indicate they have ‘some’ influence 
gradually increases from 4 percent to 14 percent. Furthermore, the 
percentage of those that indicate ‘none’ as an answer gradually 
decreases from 75 percent of those with a ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income 
level to 55 percent of those that indicated ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their 
income level. Judging from these responses we could say that the 
higher the level of incomes, the more people tend to feel they have a 
higher influence over decision-making at the national level. 
Chart 13.3
When it comes to the ideological profile, from the chart it looks 
like there is no significant variation. Again, the ‘none’ influence 
 28
 
Chart 13.2 
In relation to citizens’ perceived influence in decision-making at the national level, from the 
chart below (chart 13.3), it is visible that there is some interesting variation in terms of the 
level of incomes. Thus when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ incom  
range, the percentage of those that indicate they have ‘some’ influence gradually increases 
from 4 percent to 14 percent. Furthermore, the percentage of those that indicate ‘none’ as an 
answer gradually decreases from 75 percent of those with a ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income level to 
55 percent of those that indicated ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their income level. Judging from 
these responses we could say that the higher the level of incomes, the more people tend to 
feel they have a higher influence over decision-making at the national level.  
 
Chart 13.3 
When it comes to the ideological profile, from the chart it looks like there is no significant 
variation. Again, the ‘none’ influence answer looks less popular among the central political 
spectrum respondents compared to the extremes of left and right (with 59 percent, 57 
percent and 62 percent, against 68 percent and 64 percent).  
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answer looks less popular among the central political spectrum 
respondents compared to the extremes of left and right (with 59 
percent, 57 percent and 62 percent, against 68 percent and 64 
percent). 
Chart 13.4
Before jumping to the section on trust, people were asked to 
answer a combined general question on the state capacity, its 
respect of human rights, ability to function properly and ability 
to provide services in Albania. From the chart below it is visible 
that respondents were almost equally divided in their level of 
agreement with the statements. It is important to the general aim 
of this survey to notice that a higher disagreement was expressed 
towards the statement “the Albanian state is providing basic public 
goods to its citizens”, with 57 percent of respondents answering 
that they ‘agree a little’ or ‘not at all’ with the statement. On 
the other hand, respondents agreed the most with the statement 
that “the Albanian state is present in all the Albanian territory”, 
where 53 percent of respondents answered that they ‘fully’ or 
‘partially’ agree with such a statement. 
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Section II: TRUST
Before going much deeper into issues of state size, collective 
bargaining, public services and social protection, this subchapter 
tries to generally map Albanians’ trust in some important institutions. 
Despite the fact that usually these questions aim at measuring trust, 
as noted in the chart, institutions have been lined up while taking 
into consideration the level of distrust as a primary ordering value 
(notice the blue leading area in chart 15), because of the interesting 
comparative values the level of distrust represents while being very 
significant. Although the trust values are also noted, they have not 
served as ordering values in the chart, but will be equally important 
during the analysis. 
By looking exclusively at the distrust level in chart 15 ─ those 
that exclusively indicated ‘none’ for the specific institution ─ the 
institutions that score best (low) in the distrust scale are public 
education institutions ─ with only 10 percent of respondents indicating 
‘none’ as an answer ─ followed by private hospitals with 12 percent 
and police, the media and the government, with 13 percent each. 
On the other extreme, the Central Election Commission (CEC), the 
opposition and courts scored a very high level of distrust (respectively 
30 percent, 34 percent and 35 percent) while political parties are 
distrust outliers with 45 percent of respondents indicating that they 
have no trust in them. 
If the ‘none’ answer is coupled with the ‘a little’ answer and considered 
as a low trust indication all together, then to the less trusted institutions 
above, which had a high distrust level, another one is added: public 
hospitals. Thus in the ‘none-a little’ joined distrust scale, political 
parties are still the outliers with 80 percent of respondents indicating 
no trust or a little trust and courts, opposition, CEC and public 
hospitals scoring from 69 percent to 59 percent distrust. 
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If we now turn at the trust level and see the percentage of trust here 
defined by the answer ‘a lot’, private hospitals are trust outliers 
with 23 percent of respondents indicating that they have ‘a lot’ of 
trust in these institutions. In terms of trust, private hospitals are 
followed by the Prime Minister with 20 percent of respondents 
answering a lot, the media with 16 percent and the army with 15 
percent. If we combine the answers ‘a lot’ and ‘some’ the most 
trusted institutions are the private hospitals with 65 percent and 
the public education institutions with 63 percent of respondents 
indicating either ‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of trust in them. 
Chart 15
If the current (dis)trust situation is compared with the previous 
year in the same period, it looks like people expressed a lot of 
frustration and distrust towards public institutions in the pre-
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Chart 15 
If the current (dis)trust situation is compared with the previous year in the same period, it 
looks like people expressed a lot of frustration and distrust towards public institutions in the 
pre-election time (see chart 16). It should be noted that last year’s survey had another focus, 
thus the question addressed fewer institutions, while the 2014 question aimed at expanding 
the focus by adding some service providers which will be important in the following 
questions. In 2013, courts and the Prime Minister scored very low in trust ─ and 
consequently high in distrust ─ with 45 percent of respondents indicating ‘not at all’ as an 
answer, while the media was indicated as the most trusted institution with 17 percent of 
respondents trusting it ‘very’ much. It looks like the media constantly emerges as the most 
trusted institution in surveys. In a 201119 survey on youth in Albania, the top trusted 
institution among them was the media.  
                                                 
19ArbjanMaznikuand Geron Kamberi, The living style: democracy and governance, in Albanian Youth 2011: In 
between trust and distrust for the future. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (Tirana, 2001).p. 199. 
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election time (see chart 16). It should be noted that last year’s 
survey had another focus, thus the question addressed fewer 
institutions, while the 2014 question aimed at expanding the 
focus by adding some service providers which will be important 
in the following questions. In 2013, courts and the Prime Minister 
scored very low in trust ─ and consequently high in distrust ─ 
with 45 percent of respondents indicating ‘not at all’ as an answer, 
while the media was indicated as the most trusted institution with 
17 percent of respondents trusting it ‘very’ much. It looks like 
the media constantly emerges as the most trusted institution in 
surveys. In a 201119 survey on youth in Albania, the top trusted 
institution among them was the media. 
Chart 1620
19. ArbjanMaznikuand Geron Kamberi, The living style: democracy and 
governance, in Albanian Youth 2011: In between trust and distrust for the future. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. (Tirana, 2001).p. 199.
20. Answers from the 2013 survey The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 
2013 general election.
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Chart 1620 
As it is visible from both 2013 and the current 2014 survey, courts are some of the most 
distrusted institutions in the county. In order to get a more detailed picture about the 
citizens’ perceptions on the functioning of the judicial system in Albania, this last question 
of the section asked people to indicate whether they agreed or not with some statements on 
the judicial system. It is very clear from chart 17 that the vast majority of respondents ─ 
more than 60 percent in every statement ─ showed a very low level of trust towards the 
judicial system in Albania.  
More specifically, 76 percent of respondents did not agree with the statement “the judicial 
system in Albania gives fair decisions”. Moreover more than 60 percent of respondents 
agreed with the following statements: “citizens should have political connections in order to 
get a fair judgment”, “citizens should have personal connections in order to get a fair 
judgment”, and “citizens should pay bribes/corrupt judges/prosecutors in order to get a fair 
judgment”. Accordingly, a vast majority of respondents believes that the justice system does 
not give fair decisions and that in order to get a fair judgment one should have political 
or/and personal connections or/and use a form of corruption towards key decision-making 
actors.  
                                                 
20Answers from the 2013 survey The state of Albanian democracy at the eve of 2013 general election. 
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As it is visible from both 2013 and the current 2014 survey, 
courts are some of the most distrusted institutions in the county. 
In order to get a more detailed picture about the citizens’ 
perceptions on the functioning of the judicial system in Albania, 
this last question of the section asked people to indicate whether 
they agreed or not with some statements on the judicial system. It 
is very clear from chart 17 that the vast majority of respondents 
─ more than 60 percent in every statement ─ showed a very low 
level of trust towards the judicial system in Albania. 
More specifically, 76 percent of respondents did not agree with 
the statement “the judicial system in Albania gives fair decisions”. 
Moreover more than 60 percent of respondents agreed with the 
following statements: “citizens should have political connections 
in order to get a fair judgment”, “citizens should have personal 
connections in order to get a fair judgment”, and “citizens should pay 
bribes/corrupt judges/prosecutors in order to get a fair judgment”. 
Accordingly, a vast majority of respondents believes that the justice 
system does not give fair decisions and that in order to get a fair 
judgment one should have political or/and personal connections or/
and use a form of corruption towards key decision-making actors. 
Chart 17
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Chart 17 
Below are the answers to the same question from the 2013 survey which look almost 
identical to the current picture. It looks like the current level of trust results slightly higher 
by 3-6 percent compared to 2013, especially in relation to the last statement on bribes where 
in 2013 75 percent of respondents answered that “in order to have justice, citizens must pay 
bribes”, while in 2014, 68 percent agreed with this statement.  
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Below are the answers to the same question from the 2013 survey 
which look almost identical to the current picture. It looks like 
the current level of trust results slightly higher by 3-6 percent 
compared to 2013, especially in relation to the last statement on 
bribes where in 2013 75 percent of respondents answered that “in 
order to have justice, citizens must pay bribes”, while in 2014, 
68 percent agreed with this statement. 
Chart 1821
21. Answers from the 2013 survey The state of Albanian democracy at the eve 
of 2013 general elections.
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Section III: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SOCIAL 
DIALOGUE
With the end of communism in Albania ─ as in the other post-
communist countries, except for some of them where trade unions 
were really active like in Slovenia ─ there was no such thing as 
the community of workers in collective terms and the trade unions 
became practically only formal organizations with no real legitimacy 
among workers or power to influence decision making by representing 
workers’ rights. Consequently, collective bargaining as a concept and 
phenomenon is not a very common practice in Albania. 
Nevertheless, when people were asked on who should be responsible 
for taking important decisions on wages, working hours and workers’ 
rights in Albania, a wide majority of the respondents (61 percent) 
answered that the government and the policymakers in collaboration 
with the trade unions should be responsible for this. Furthermore, 
1/5th of respondents answered that these decisions should be mainly 
discussed and decided by trade unions while the government and 
policymakers are the endpoint of the process or the receiving end. 
Only 12 percent answered that these decisions should be exclusively 
discussed and decided by public institutions, the government and 
policymakers. Accordingly, from these answers, it is visible that the 
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receiving end. Only 12 percent answered that these decisions should be exclusively 
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Accordingly, from these answers, it is visible that the majority of people believe that trade 
unions should have a very active role in deciding about issues related to workers.  
 
Chart 19  
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
From chart 19.1 it is visible that there is a certain variation in terms of incomes in relation to 
the responsible actors that should take important decisions on wages, working hours and 
workers’ rights in Albania. Thus, when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘over 160.000 
Lekë’, respondents tend to be more favorable of a collaborative decision-making model 
(with 69 percent compared to 55 percent) where both the government and trade unions are 
taking part, while the exclusivity of one or the other is less desirable. This pattern was also 
previously noticed from the question on decision-making over public services’ management, 
where the higher the income the more respondents tended to support a collaborative model 
of decision-making.  
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majority of people believe that trade unions should have a very active 
role in deciding about issues related to workers. 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
From chart 19.1 it is visible that there is a certain variation in 
terms of incomes in relation to the responsible actors that should 
take important decisions on wages, working hours and workers’ 
rights in Albania. Thus, when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to 
‘over 160.000 Lekë’, respondents tend to be more favorable of a 
collaborative decision-making model (with 69 percent compared 
to 55 percent) where both the government and trade unions 
are taking part, while the exclusivity of one or the other is less 
desirable. This pattern was also previously noticed from the 
question on decision-making over public services’ management, 
where the higher the income the more respondents tended to 
support a collaborative model of decision-making. 
Chart 19.1
From chart 19.2 it is clear that no variation is noticed in terms 
of ideological profile, although those identifying as belonging to 
the centre tend to be more supportive of a collaborative model of 
decision-making compared to the rest of the political spectrum. 
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From chart 19.2 it is clear that no variation is noticed in terms of ideological profile, 
although those identifying as belonging to the centre tend to be more supportive of a 
collaborative mode of decision-making compared to the rest of the political spectrum.  
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While to the previous question, the majority of respondents (61 percent) answered that 
decisions in relation to workers’ issues were to be taken by policymakers’ in collaboration 
with trade unions, the first important clue from this questions’ chart is that respondents’ felt 
like not having enough information in relation to the current situation of trade unions in 
Albania. Thus, to two important statements on trade unions’ activity ─ trade unions are 
“existent but ineffective in supporting workers’ rights” and they are “not independent from 
political parties or other fractions” ─ almost half or respondents were not able to give an 
answer on agreement or disagreement. Moreover, 86 percent of respondents were not able to 
agree or disagree with the statement that trade unions today are “active and effective in 
supporting workers’ rights”.  
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Chart 19.2
While to the previous question, the majority of respondents (61 
percent) answered that decisions in relation to workers’ issues 
were to be taken by policymakers’ in collaboration with trade 
unions, the first important clue from this questions’ chart is that 
respondents’ felt like not having enough information in relation 
to the current situation of trade unions in Albania. Thus, to two 
important statements on trade unions’ activity ─ trade unions are 
“existent but ineffective in supporting workers’ rights” and they 
are “not independent from political parties or other fractions” ─ 
almost half or respondents were not able to give an answer on 
agreement or disagreement. Moreover, 86 percent of respondents 
were not able to agree or disagree with the statement that trade 
unions today are “active and effective in supporting workers’ 
rights”. 
Besides the lack of information on specific issues related to the 
trade unions’ current activity, for those that expressed agreement 
or disagreement with the statements, more than half indicated 
that trade unions are “existent but ineffective in supporting 
workers’ rights” and 33 percent agreed that these unions are 
“not independent from political parties or other fractions”. It is 
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interesting to see that more than half or respondents (56 percent) 
answered did not agree with the statement that trade unions were 
“nonexistent after the end of communism” while only 31 percent 
agreed. 
Chart 20
When looking at the overall picture presented by respondents’ 
answers to the above mentioned statements, it seems like most 
of people are aware of trade unions’ existence but have no 
information on their current activity in Albania.
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Besides the lack of information on specific issues related to the trade unions’ current 
activity, for those that expressed agreement or disagreement with the statements, more than 
half indicated that trade unions are “existent but ineffective in supporting workers’ rights” 
and 33 percent agreed that these unions are “not independent from political parties or other 
fractions”. It is interesting to se  that more than half or respondents (56 percent) answered 
did not agree with the statement that trade unions were “nonexistent after the end of 
communism” while only 31 percent agreed.  
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When looking at the overall picture presented by respondents’ answers to the above 
mentioned statements, it seems like most of people are aware of trade unions’ existence but 
have no information on their current activity in Albania. 
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Section IV: PUBLIC SERVICES AND STATE SIZE
This subchapter on public services and state size represents 
one of the main sections of the survey where some crucial 
questions have been asked. This set of questions aimed at getting 
respondents’ opinions on main issues that would answer some 
‘who’ and ‘how’ questions. These inquiry into actors, roles and 
modalities is fundamental in understanding citizens’ stances 
on the welfare, the role of the state and its’ size and especially 
the values that stand at the basis of the social tissue in Albania. 
Whether it is a need for efficiency, a demand for major social 
solidarity, a request for more space for personal initiative or 
the legacy of the past that stands behind respondents’ opinions 
and answers, this is something that needs further research to 
be defined. Nevertheless, this section’s questions give some 
important insights into the current stands of Albanian citizens in 
relation to the state and society as well as in relation to the state-
society relationship. 
Apart from the general need to map Albanian citizens’ values, 
opinions and stances in relation to these important issues, this 
chapter has a very contemporary profile in measuring citizens’ 
stances on a main theme of the Albanian public debate during 
these years: the public versus the private provision of public 
services. Consequently, this section provides an outline of 
Albanian citizens’ attitudes over the above theme in relation to 
some core public services provision by the state or by private 
entities. 
When answering about who should be the main provider of some 
core public services, respondents were relatively consistent in 
their opinion that the state had to be the main provider. Yet, 
within this major trend there are some variations to be taken 
Towards a redefinition of the social contract
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into consideration. On the one extreme of the chart there is 
public safety and justice which were indicated as exclusive state 
provision domains with 91 percent of respondents indicating the 
state as the main provider in each case. On the other extreme 
of the chart there are situated post offices, housing and jobs 
where the state is still seen as the main provider, but to a lower 
percentage ─ 66-69 percent ─ compared to the other services. It 
is significant to notice that housing in terms of provision is seen 
by 8 percent of respondents as the domain of the family and other 
similar entities, although this is a very low percentage compared 
to those indicating the state as the major responsible actor that 
should take care of housing provisions. 
Chart 21
As some services are very significant and important in order 
to understand citizens’ opinions and viewpoints on provision 
matters, the following three questions specifically focus on 
education, health care and pensions (retirement fund). Questions 
are intentionally formulated in a ‘should be’ fashion in order to 
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As some services are very significant and important in order to understand citizens’ opinions 
and viewpoints on provision matters, the following three questions specifically focus on 
education, health care and pensions (retirement fund). Questions are intentionally 
formulated in a ‘should be’ fashion in order to make respondents indicate their preferred 
configuration of the service despite the current status of such a service in terms of provision 
and management. Fur ermo , in terms of values, such a formulation i vites respondents to
consider the normative dimension of the issue.  
Regarding education, the majority of respondents (44 percent) answered that education in 
Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation”. A similar share of answers (40 
percent) indicated that education in Albania should be “public and funded partly by taxes 
and partly by users’ fees”. These two options ─ where a predominantly public profile of 
education in Albania is stated ─ represent the major indicated ones, while the other two 
options ─ that education should be “publicly funded by managed by private organizations” 
and “private and paid for directly by citizens when using it” ─ were indicated only by 8 
percent and 3 percent of respondents respectively.  
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make respondents indicate their preferred configuration of the 
service despite the current status of such a service in terms of 
provision and management. Furthermore, in terms of values, 
such a formulation invites respondents to consider the normative 
dimension of the issue. 
Regarding education, the majority of respondents (44 percent) 
answered that education in Albania should be “public and funded 
by general taxation”. A similar share of answers (40 percent) 
indicated that education in Albania should be “public and funded 
partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”. These two options ─ 
where a predominantly public profile of education in Albania is 
stated ─ represent the major indicated ones, while the other two 
options ─ that education should be “publicly funded by managed 
by private organizations” and “private and paid for directly by 
citizens when using it” ─ were indicated only by 8 percent and 3 
percent of respondents respectively. 
Chart 22
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Chart 22 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
When it comes to financial matters in relation to education in Albania, there is a clear 
variation in terms of income (Chart 22.1). Thus, the higher the incomes the more 
respondents tend to support that education in Albania should be “public and funded partly 
by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (with a variation from 39 percent to 47 percent with the 
increase of incomes), while with the increase of incomes the less respondents tend to support 
the option that education in Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation” (with 
a variation from 50 percent to 29 percent with the increase of incomes). Furthermore, with 
the increase of incomes respondents are more supportive of the statement that education in 
Albania should be “publicly funded but managed by private organizations”, although this 
answer was not the most popular ones in general terms.  
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From chart 22.2 it is visible that there is no variation in terms of ideological profile in 
relation to the funding and management of education in Albania. Thus, the left, central left 
and central right wing respondents mainly prefer an education that is “public and funded by 
general taxation” (48 percent, 48 percent and 47 percent of them respectively), while centre 
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Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
When it comes to financial matters in relation to education in 
Albania, there is a clear variation in terms of income (Chart 
22.1). Thus, the higher the incomes the more respondents tend to 
support that education in Albania should be “public and funded 
partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (with a variation from 
39 percent to 47 percent with the increase of incomes), while with 
the increase of incomes the less respondents tend to support the 
option that education in Albania should be “public and funded by 
general taxation” (with a variation from 50 percent to 29 percent 
with the increase of incomes). Furthermore, with the increase of 
incomes respondents are more supportive of the statement that 
education in Albania should be “publicly funded but managed 
by private organizations”, although this answer was not the most 
popular ones in general terms. 
Chart 22.1
From chart 22.2 it is visible that there is no variation in terms 
of ideological profile in relation to the funding and management 
of education in Albania. Thus, the left, central left and central 
right wing respondents mainly prefer an education that is “public 
and funded by general taxation” (48 percent, 48 percent and 
 39
 
Chart 22 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
When it comes to financial matters in relation to education in Albania, there is a clear 
variation in terms of income (Chart 22.1). Thus, the higher the incomes the more 
respondents tend to support that education in Albania should be “public and funded partly 
by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (with a variation from 39 percent to 47 percent with the 
ncrease of incomes), while with th  increas  of incomes the less respondents t nd to support 
the option that education in Albania should be “public and funded by general taxation” (with 
a variation from 50 percent to 29 percent with the increase of incomes). Furthermore, with 
the increase of incomes respondents are more supportive of the statement that education in 
Albania should be “publicly funded but managed by private organizations”, although this 
answer was not the most popular ones in general terms.  
 
Chart 22.1 
From chart 22.2 it is visible that there is no variation in terms of ideological profile in 
relation to the funding and management of education in Alba ia. Thus, the left, central left 
and central right wing respondents mainly prefer an education that is “public and funded by 
general taxation” (48 percent, 48 percent and 47 percent of them respectively), while centre 
3%
4%
8%
40%
44%
Private and paid for directly by citizens when using it
Don’t  know/No answer
Publicly funded but managed by private 
rganizatio s
Public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users 
fees
Public and funded by general taxation
Education in Albania should be:
50%
47%
42%
36% 29%
39% 40%
43%
42% 47%
5%
9% 7%
15% 14%
2% 2% 5% 2% 4%4% 3 4
6% 6%
0‐ 30.000 Lekë 30.001‐ 60.000 
Lekë
60.001‐ 100.000 
Lekë
100.001‐
160.000 Lekë
Over 160.000 
Lekë
Education in Albania should be:
Public and funded by general 
taxation
Public and funded partly by 
taxes and partly by users fees
Publicly funded but managed 
by private organizations
Private and paid for directly by 
citizens when using it
Don't know/No answer
ALBANIANS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL
60
47 percent of them respectively), while centre and right wing 
respondents prefer an education that is “public and funded partly 
by taxes and partly by users’ fees” (48 percent and 47 percent 
respectively). 
Chart 22.2
When the same question is asked about the health care in Albania, 
respondents’ preferences are almost identical to the previous 
question. Accordingly, half of respondents answered that health 
care should be “public and funded by general taxation” and 32 
percent answered that it should be “public and funded partly 
by taxes and partly by users fees”. Thus, more than 80 percent 
of respondents chose the same two options for both education 
and health care. Only 11 percent of respondents answered that 
health care should be “publicly funded but managed by private 
organizations”. 
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When it comes to the funding and management of the health care system in Albania, there is 
a limited variation in terms of incomes. Thus, when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to 
‘100.000-160.000 Lekë’ support for a health care that is “public and funded by general 
taxation’” decreases (from 55 percent to 43 percent), only to get higher again (57 percent) 
for those respondents that indicated ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their income level. The opposite 
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Chart 23
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
When it comes to the funding and management of the health 
care system in Albania, there is a limited variation in terms of 
incomes. Thus, when moving from ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ to ‘100.000-
160.000 Lekë’ support for a health care that is “public and funded 
by general taxation” decreases (from 55 percent to 43 percent), 
only to get higher again (57 percent) for those respondents 
that indicated ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ as their income level. The 
opposite trend happens with the statement that health care in 
Albania should be “public and funded partly by taxes and partly 
by users’ fees”. 
Chart 23.1
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trend happens with the statement that health care in Albania should be “public and funded 
partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”.  
 
Chart 23.1 
From chart 23.2 we see a previously noted trend in relation to the ideological profile: the 
extreme left and right have similar views while differing from the central part of the political 
spectrum. Thus, in relation to health care, while left wing and right wing respondents and 
right mainly support a health care that is “public and funded by general taxation”─ with 57 
percent and 51 percent respectively ─ central left, centre and central right tend to be more 
balanced in between a health care that is “public and funded by general taxation” and 
“public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users’ fees”. 
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In relation to pensions, only 1/3rd of respondents believed that the current status quo ─ 
where pensions are publicly managed and funded by social contributions ─ was the way 
pensions in Albania should be. Instead, almost half of respondents (49 percent) indicated 
that pensions should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing 
those who choose to do so to devote part of the contributions to a private fund”. It is 
interesting to see that 9 percent of respondents choose an option not very popular in Albania 
yet, the private schemes of pensions.  
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From chart 23.2 we see a previously noted trend in relation to the 
ideological profile: the extreme left and right have similar views 
while differing from the central part of the political spectrum. 
Thus, in relation to health care, while left wing and right wing 
respondents and right mainly support a health care that is “public 
and funded by general taxation” ─ with 57 percent and 51 
percent respectively ─ central left, centre and central right tend 
to be more balanced in between a health care that is “public and 
funded by general taxation” and “public and funded partly by 
taxes and partly by users’ fees”.
Chart 23.2
In relation to pensions, only 1/3rd of respondents believed that 
the current status quo ─ where pensions are publicly managed 
and funded by social contributions ─ was the way pensions 
in Albania should be. Instead, almost half of respondents (49 
percent) indicated that pensions should be “publicly managed and 
funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose to 
do so to devote part of the contributions to a private fund”. It is 
interesting to see that 9 percent of respondents choose an option 
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Chart 24
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
From chart 24.1 it is visible that there is a considerable variation 
in terms of income when it comes to how pensions in Albania 
should be funded and managed. Thus, with the increase of 
incomes, respondents tend to increasingly support the statement 
that pensions in Albania should be “publicly managed and 
funded by social contributions, but allowing those who choose 
 42
 
Chart 24 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
From chart 24.1 it is visible that there is a considerable variation in terms of income when it 
comes to how pensions in Albania should be funded and managed. Thus, with the increase 
of incomes, respondents tend to increasingly support the statement that pensions in Albania 
should be “publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but allowing those who 
choose to do so to devote p rt of their contributions to a private fund” a d d creasingly 
support the statement that pensions should be “publicly managed and funded by social 
contributions as they currently are”. In the same way, with the increase of incomes 
respondents also tend to choose the statement that pensions in Albania should be “fully 
working on private schemes and private contributions”.  
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From chart 24.2 we can see that there is no meaningful variation in terms of ideological 
profile. Nevertheless, it could be noticed that while all the political spectrum respondents 
tend to be more supportive of a mixed scheme where the right to choose is also present, the 
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to do so to devote part of their contributions to a private fund” and 
decreasingly support the statement that pensions should be “publicly 
managed and funded by social contributions as they currently are”. 
In the same way, with the increase of incomes respondents also tend 
to choose the statement that pensions in Albania should be “fully 
working on private schemes and private contributions”. 
From chart 24.2 we can see that there is no meaningful variation in 
terms of ideological profile. Nevertheless, it could be noticed that while 
all the political spectrum respondents tend to be more supportive of a 
mixed scheme where the right to choose is also present, the left wing 
respondents are more ideological in their answer with 39 percent of 
them supporting pension schemes that are “publicly managed and 
funded by social contributions as they currently are”. 
Chart 24.2
When it comes to the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the 
standards of those public services that are provided by the state 
in Albania, there is a consistent trend with previous questions. In 
the same fashion as in the questions about the level of trust, in 
Chart 25, public services have been listed in relation to citizens’ 
reported level of dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction. From 
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When it comes to the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the standards of those public 
services that are provided by the state in Albania, there is a consistent trend with previous 
questions. In the same fashion as in the questions about the l vel of trust, in Chart 25, public 
services have been listed in relation to citizens’ reported level of dissatisfaction rather than 
satisfaction. From chart 25 it is visible that the better scoring services are electricity, 
education and water supply with the smallest percentage of people indicating “not satisfied” 
as an answer (respectively 13 percent, 14 percent and 18 percent). O  the other side, 
respondents were satisfied the less with waste management, employment promotion and 
consumer’s protection with 56 percent, 52 percent and 44 percent respectively choosing “not 
satisfied” as an answer.  
If the dissatisfaction options “not satisfied” and “not very satisfied” are combined, then the 
worst rated public services in terms of citizens’ satisfaction are health care with 87 percent, 
justice and/or justice related issues with 85 percent and employment promotion with 85 
percent. It is important to notice that apart from electricity, for all of the other services more 
than 50 percent of citizens indicated that they are ‘not satisfied’ or ‘not very satisfied’.  
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chart 25 it is visible that the better scoring services are electricity, 
education and water supply with the smallest percentage of people 
indicating “not satisfied” as an answer (respectively 13 percent, 
14 percent and 18 percent). On the other side, respondents were 
satisfied the less with waste management, employment promotion 
and consumer’s protection with 56 percent, 52 percent and 44 
percent respectively choosing “not satisfied” as an answer. 
If the dissatisfaction options “not satisfied” and “not very satisfied” 
are combined, then the worst rated public services in terms of 
citizens’ satisfaction are health care with 87 percent, justice and/or 
justice related issues with 85 percent and employment promotion 
with 85 percent. It is important to notice that apart from electricity, 
for all of the other services more than 50 percent of citizens 
indicated that they are ‘not satisfied’ or ‘not very satisfied’. 
Chart 25
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Chart 25 
In order to get some further insights into citizens’ opinions about some important public 
services, they were asked about the quality of the services provided by public and private 
institutions in Albania. Respondents’ answers to this question were consistent with the 
previous ones. Thus, when asked who provides a better quality of services, public safety and 
education were the top ones where public institutions are seen as the better providers, with 
65 percent and 63 percent of answers respectively indicating public institutions. On the other 
side, health care and employment promotion are seen as better provided by the private 
sector, with 69 percent and 52 percent respectively indicating the private sector. These 
answers are consistent especially with the previous question on trust where private hospitals 
and public education institutions were among the most trusted institutions.  
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In order to get some further insights into citizens’ opinions about 
some important public services, they were asked about the quality 
of the services provided by public and private institutions in 
Albania. Respondents’ answers to this question were consistent 
with the previous ones. Thus, when asked who provides a better 
quality of services, public safety and education were the top ones 
where public institutions are seen as the better providers, with 65 
percent and 63 percent of answers respectively indicating public 
institutions. On the other side, health care and employment 
promotion are seen as better provided by the private sector, with 
69 percent and 52 percent respectively indicating the private 
sector. These answers are consistent especially with the previous 
question on trust where private hospitals and public education 
institutions were among the most trusted institutions. 
Chart 26
A consistent trend throughout the survey ─ and especially along 
this section─ is respondents’ tendency to choose the state, 
public institutions and public funding as the preferred and the 
most desirable way to provide public services (with very few 
exceptions regarding health care and sometimes housing, 
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Chart 26 
A consistent trend throughout the survey ─ and especially along this section─ is 
respondents’ tendency to choose the state, public institutions and public funding as the 
preferred and the most desirable way to provide public services (with very few exceptions 
regarding health care and sometimes housing, employment promotion, etc). As state 
provided public services are closely related to the level of taxes and citizens’ contributions, 
the next question asked whether people agr ed or disagreed with some statement related to 
taxation.  
Respondents’ agreed the most ─ 70 percent in both cases ─ with the statements that “I 
would be willing to contribute with non financial means (volunteering, community services, 
etc)” and “who earns more should pay more”. Respondents were almost equally divided in 
answering in relation to the statement “the level of taxes should increase if this would bring 
to better services”, with 51 percent disagreeing and 49 percent agreeing. Respondents 
disagreed the most with the statements “the level of taxes should decrease as I am willing to 
privately provide services for myself and family” and “income taxes should have a fixed rate 
despite the level of incomes”, with 60 percent disagreeing with the first statement and 62 
percent disagreeing with the second.  
From these answers it is visible that while respondents are undecided if they would pay 
more for better services, they are more decided about how they think public services should 
be paid for. The two statements “who earns more should pay more” and “income taxes 
should have a fixed rate despite the level of incomes” were meant to portray the progressive 
and the flat tax in simple words.22Accordingly, in terms of taxation, it looks like respondents 
support progressive taxation compared to flat taxation. From respondents’ answers it is 
visible that people would prefer the social gap to be reduced by those who earn more to pay 
more.  
                                                 
22The flat tax also means that who earns more should pay more, even when the taxation rate is fixed, but in our 
case putting this statement with the other that specifically mentioned the fixed rate serves to distinguish the two 
statements as different. 
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employment promotion, etc). As state provided public services 
are closely related to the level of taxes and citizens’ contributions, 
the next question asked whether people agreed or disagreed with 
some statement related to taxation. 
Respondents’ agreed the most ─ 70 percent in both cases ─ with 
the statements that “I would be willing to contribute with non 
financial means (volunteering, community services, etc)” and 
“who earns more should pay more”. Respondents were almost 
equally divided in answering in relation to the statement “the level 
of taxes should increase if this would bring to better services”, 
with 51 percent disagreeing and 49 percent agreeing. Respondents 
disagreed the most with the statements “the level of taxes should 
decrease as I am willing to privately provide services for myself 
and family” and “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite 
the level of incomes”, with 60 percent disagreeing with the first 
statement and 62 percent disagreeing with the second. 
From these answers it is visible that while respondents are 
undecided if they would pay more for better services, they are 
more decided about how they think public services should be 
paid for. The two statements “who earns more should pay more” 
and “income taxes should have a fixed rate despite the level of 
incomes” were meant to portray the progressive and the flat tax 
in simple words.22Accordingly, in terms of taxation, it looks 
like respondents support progressive taxation compared to flat 
taxation. From respondents’ answers it is visible that people 
would prefer the social gap to be reduced by those who earn 
more to pay more. 
22. The flat tax also means that who earns more should pay more, even when the 
taxation rate is fixed, but in our case putting this statement with the other that 
specifically mentioned the fixed rate serves to distinguish the two statements as 
different.
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Chart 27
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
The cross-tabulations reported below in relation to chart 27 
have been selected in accordance to their significant variations 
in relation to incomes and/or ideological profile while those 
statements where there was no variation, or where variation was 
insignificant, were left out. 
In relation to the statement, “who earns more should pay more”, 
from chart 27.1 it can be noticed that there is variation in relation 
to the level of incomes. Thus, with the increase of incomes there 
is a decrease in respondents’ agreement with the statement. 
While 71 percent of ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range respondents 
agree that “who earns more should pay more”, 58 percent of 
‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agreed with the 
statement. The rest of income ranges’ level of agreement varied 
in between these two percentage values. This reported variation 
fulfils expectations as the more people earn, the less they are 
willing to support a progressive taxation, although 58 percent of 
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Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
The cross-tabulations reported below in relation to chart 27 have been selected in 
accordance to their significant variations in relation to incomes and/or ideological profile 
while those statements where there was no variation, or where variation was insignificant, 
were left out.  
In relation to the statement, “who earns more should pay more”, from chart 27.1 it can be 
noticed that there is variation in relation to the level of incomes. Thus, with the increase of 
incomes there is a decrease in respondents’ agreement w th the statement. While 71 perce t
of ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agree that “who earns more should pay more”, 
58 percent of ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agreed with the statement. The 
rest of income ranges’ level of agreement varied in between these two percentage values. 
This reported variation fulfils expectations as the more people earn, the less they are willing 
to support a progressive taxation, although 58 percent of support from the ‘over 160.000 
Lekë’ income range respondents is still a high value of support for progressive taxation.  
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An important variation is present even in relation to respondents’ ideological profile. Thus, 
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support from the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents 
is still a high value of support for progressive taxation.
 
Chart 27.1
An important variation is present even in relation to respondents’ 
ideological profile. Thus, from chart 27.2 it is clear that when 
going from the left side of the political spectrum to the right 
side, respondents’ agreement with the statement “who earns 
more should pay more” decreases. Thus, as 82 percent of left 
wing respondents agreed with the statement, 57 percent of right 
wing respondents agreed, while the other central positions of 
the political spectrum falling somewhere in between these 
values. This reported variation fits the general expectations 
in relation to the ideological profile as the righter one goes in 
the political spectrum the less people support a progressive 
taxation. Nevertheless, 57 percent of support from the right wing 
respondents for the statement is still very high for a right wing 
ideology. 
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Një variacion i rëndësi hëm është i pranishëm edhe në varësi të profilit ideologjik të të 
anketuarve. Kështu, nga grafiku 27.2 është e qartë se kur lëvizet nga ana e majtë e spektrit 
politik në anën e djathtë bie niveli i pajtimit të të anketuarve me pohimin “kush fiton më 
shumë duhet të paguajë më shumë”. Kështu, pasi 82 përqind e të anketuarve të krahut të 
majtë pajtohen me deklaratën, 57 përqind e të anketuarve të krahut të djathtë bien dakord, 
ndë sa pjesa qendrore  spektrit pol tik gjendet diku midis këtyre vlerave. Ky variacion i 
raportuar përshtatet me pritshmërinë e përgjithshme në lidhje me profilin ideologjik, sipas të 
cilit sa më në të djathtë të spektrit politik të shkosh, aq më pak njerëz do e mbështesin një 
taksimit progresiv. Megjithatë, 57 përqind mbështetje nga ana e të anketuarve të krahut të 
djathtë për një qëndrim të tillë është prapë një përqindje shumë e lartë për mbështetësit e një 
i eologjie të djathtë. 
 
Grafiku 27.2 
Kur është fjala për nivelin e taksimit, përsëri ka variacion në varësi të nivelit të të ardhurave. 
Nga grafiku 27.3 është e dukshme se me rritjen e të ardhurave, rritet dhe niveli i mbështetjes 
për qëndrimin se “niveli i taksave duhet të rritet në qoftë se kjo do të sjellë në shërbime më 
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Chart 27 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
The cross-tabulations reported below in relation to chart 27 have been selected in 
accordance to their significant variations in relation to incomes and/or ideological profile 
while those statements where there was no variation, or where variation was insignificant, 
were left out.  
In relation to the statement, “who earns more should pay more”, from chart 27.1 it can be 
noticed that there is variation in relation to the level of incomes. Thus, with the increase of 
incomes there is a decrease in respondents’ agreement with the statement. While 71 percent 
of ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income r nge respondents agree that “who earns more should pay more”, 
58 percent of ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income range respondents agreed with the statement. The 
rest of income ranges’ level of agreement varied in between these two percentage values. 
This reported variation fulfils expectations as the more people earn, the less they are willing 
to support a progressive taxation, although 58 percent of support from the ‘over 160.000 
Lekë’ income range respondents is still a high value of support for progressive taxation.  
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When it comes to the level of taxation, again there is variation 
in relation to the level of incomes. From chart 27.3 it is visible 
that with the increase of incomes, the level of support for the 
statement that “the level of taxes should increase if this would 
bring to better services” increases. Thus, while support for the 
statement is 40 percent for the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range 
respondents, this support gradually amounts with the rise of 
incomes until reaching 55 percent for the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ 
income category. 
Chart 27.3
In relation to the same question and respondents’ ideological 
profile, from chart 27.4 it looks like there is some variation in 
relation to the ideological profile ─ except for the left wing 
respondents where the pattern is not continues. Thus, when 
moving from the central left to the right wing, the percentage 
of those supporting the statement gradually decreases from 57 
percent to 44 percent. 
Chart 27.4
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right side, respondents’ agreement with the statement “who earns more should pay more” 
decreases. Thus, as 82 percent of left wing respondents agreed with the statement, 57 
percent of right wing respondents agreed, while the other central positions of the political 
spectrum falling somewhere in between these values. This reported variation fits the general 
expectations in relation to the ideological profile as the righter one goes in the political 
spectrum the less people support a progressive taxation. Nevertheless, 57 percent of support 
from the right wing respondents for the statement is still very high for a right wing ideology.  
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until reaching 55 percent for the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ income category.  
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Chart 27.4 
When it comes to fix taxation, there were no important income variations in relation to 
respondents’ stances, while all of the income ranges mainly disagreed with a flat taxation.  
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When it comes to the ideological profile of respondents in relation to the same question 
there is some important variation. Thus, when we move from the left wing to the right wing 
in the political spectrum, the level of support for the flat taxation gradually increases, while 
the entire political spectrum is mostly against the fact that taxation should have a fixed rate. 
Thus, while 30 percent of left wing respondents support flat taxation, 47 percent of right 
wing respondents support it. Although this variation and the support trend was expected, still 
the right wing general level of support for the flat taxation (47 percent) is lower than 
expected.  
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should contract managing private companies without giving up state ownership over state 
enterprises” and that “privatization makes state enterprises more effective in providing 
services”, with respectively 70 percent and 66 percent. On the other hand, respondents 
disagreed to a similar degree ─ respectively 72 percent and 65 percent ─ with the statements 
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When it comes to fix taxation, there were no important income 
variations in relation to respondents’ stances, while all of the 
income ranges mainly disagreed with a flat taxation. 
Chart 27.5
When it comes to the ideological profile of respondents in 
relation to the same question there is some important variation. 
Thus, when we move from the left wing to the right wing in 
the political spectrum, the level of support for the flat taxation 
gradually increases, while the entire political spectrum is mostly 
against the fact that taxation should have a fixed rate. Thus, 
while 30 percent of left wing respondents support flat taxation, 
47 percent of right wing respondents support it. Although this 
variation and the support trend was expected, still the right wing 
general level of support for the flat taxation (47 percent) is lower 
than expected. 
Chart 27.6
Last but not least, a question that would give some further 
insides on Albanian citizens’ preferred size of the state was 
the one related to privatization and state enterprises. From 
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Chart 27.4 
When it comes to fix taxation, there were no important income variations in relation to 
respondents’ stances, while all of the income ranges mainly disagreed with a flat taxation.  
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the chart below it is visible that citizens agreed the most with 
two statements “the Albanian state should contract managing 
private companies without giving up state ownership over state 
enterprises” and that “privatization makes state enterprises more 
effective in providing services”, with respectively 70 percent and 
66 percent. On the other hand, respondents disagreed to a similar 
degree ─ respectively 72 percent and 65 percent ─ with the 
statements “all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized” 
and “no privatization process of any kind should be applied for 
any state enterprise ownership or service management”. 
While most of respondents indicate that privatization makes 
state enterprises more effective in providing services, even more 
respondents think that not all state enterprises in Albania should 
be privatized. It looks like the golden mean for them is the 
application of a model where the state continues to be the owner 
of important enterprises while private companies are contracted 
only for the management part. 
Chart 28
 49
“all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized” and “no privatization process of any 
kind should be applied for any state enterprise ownership or service management”.  
While most of r spondents indicate that privatizati n makes state enterprises more effective 
in providing services, even more respondents think that not all state enterprises in Albania 
should be privatized. It looks like the golden mean for them is the application of a model 
where the state continues to be the owner of important enterprises while private companies 
are contracted only for the management part.  
 
Chart 28 
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
While we are not reporting the income chart here as there was no variation in terms of 
income in relation to whether or not the Albanian state should contract managing private 
companies without giving up ownership over state enterprises, a different picture is present 
when it comes to respondents’ ideological profile. Although the pattern is no complete when 
it comes to the right wing respondents’ attitudes, still there is some variation when moving 
from the left wing to central right. Thus, while 72 percent of left wing respondents agree 
with the fact that the state in Albania should contract managing companies without giving 
up state ownership over state enterprises, this percentage decreases to 55 percent of the 
central right respondents.  
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Variation in terms of income and ideological profile
While we are not reporting the income chart here as there was 
no variation in terms of income in relation to whether or not 
the Albanian state should contract managing private companies 
without giving up ownership over state enterprises, a different 
picture is present when it comes to respondents’ ideological 
profile. Although the pattern is no complete when it comes to 
the right wing respondents’ attitudes, still there is some variation 
when moving from the left wing to central right. Thus, while 
72 percent of left wing respondents agree with the fact that the 
state in Albania should contract managing companies without 
giving up state ownership over state enterprises, this percentage 
decreases to 55 percent of the central right respondents. 
Chart 28.1
In relation to the statement that “privatization makes state 
enterprises more effective in providing services”, there was 
no significant variation in terms of income but some important 
variation in terms of ideological profile. Although, the right wing 
respondents are still outliers from the pattern, there is a gradual 
increase in agreement with the statement when moving from the 
left side of the spectrum to central right (from 59 percent to 85 
percent).
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In relation to the statement that “no privatization process of any kind should be applied for 
any state enterprise ownership or service management” there was no significant variation in 
terms of ideological profile but there is some variation in terms of income. Thus, with the 
increase of incomes, respondents tend to disagree with the statement more.   
 
Chart 28.3 
When it comes to the statement that “all state enterprises in Albania should be privatized” 
there is a significant variation in terms of ideological profile. Thus, when moving from the 
left side of the spectrum to the right side, respondents’ agreement with the statement tend to 
rise. This trend is generally compatible with expectations.  
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Chart 28.2
In relation to the statement that “no privatization process of 
any kind should be applied for any state enterprise ownership 
or service management” there was no significant variation in 
terms of ideological profile but there is some variation in terms 
of income. Thus, with the increase of incomes, respondents tend 
to disagree with the statement more.  
Chart 28.3
When it comes to the statement that “all state enterprises in 
Albania should be privatized” there is a significant variation in 
terms of ideological profile. Thus, when moving from the left 
side of the spectrum to the right side, respondents’ agreement 
with the statement tend to rise. This trend is generally compatible 
with expectations. 
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Section V: EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL 
PROTECTION
After inviting respondents to think about public services 
and the private versus public provisions, this section focuses 
on societal issues by measuring citizens’ opinions on social 
protection and equal opportunities. This section is especially 
related to issues of social solidarity which lie at the foundation 
of welfare states and for some European philosophical schools it 
represents one of the main social cohesion elements for modern 
societies. Consequently, the section deals with issues such as: 
fair society, the social assistance, the rich-poor gap, job security, 
redistribution policies, etc. Compared to previous sections, this 
one is specifically digging into the values and principles that lie 
beneath or at the centre of citizens’ opinions and viewpoints. 
Starting from a question that defines the foundation of the chapter, 
we asked how citizens perceived a fair society. Respondents were 
mainly divided between two statements: that in a fair society 
“who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments 
of society should be assisted by the state” and “no one is left 
without basic public services despite their ability to contribute”, 
which were indicated by 36 percent of respondents each. Another 
1/5th of respondents answered that in a fair society “everyone is 
rewarded in wealth in accordance to talent and contribution”. 
In either a moderate or in a kind of radical way, the majority 
of respondents (72 percent) believed that in a fair society there 
should be a certain degree of solidarity for the disadvantaged 
segments of society. 
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Chart 29
Continuing with a specific question on the unemployment assistance 
in Albania, a large majority of respondents (83 percent) answered 
that the current allocated sum per household was too small. The 
other two options ─ where the unemployment assistance is stated 
as high or as about right ─ got some insignificant indication 
percentage compared to the above option. While it is almost 
impossible for 83 percent of our sample to have personally been 
assisted through this assistance scheme, it is clear that citizens’ 
perceive this assistance as insufficient despite their personal 
experience.
Chart 30
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Section V: EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION 
After inviting respondents to think about public services and the private versus public 
provisions, this section focuses on societal issues by measuring citizens’ opinions on social 
protection and equal opportunities. This section is especially related to issues of social 
solidarity which lie at the foundation of welfare states and for some European philosophical 
schools it represents one of the main social cohesion elements for modern societies. 
Consequently, the section deals with issues such as: fair society, the social assistance, the 
rich-poor gap, job security, redistribution policies, etc. Compared to previous sections, this 
one is specifically digging into the values and principles that lie beneath or at the centre of 
citizens’ opinions and viewpoints.  
Starting from a question that defines the foundation of the chapter, we asked how citizens 
perceived a fair society. Respondents were mainly divided between two statements: that in a 
fair society “who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments of society 
should be assisted by the state” and “no one is left without basic public services despite their 
ability to contribute”, which were indicated by 36 percent of respondents each. Another 1/5th 
of respondents answered that in a fair society “everyone is rewarded in wealth in accordance 
to talent and contribution”. In either a moderate or in a kind of radical way, the majority of 
respondents (72 percent) believed that in a fair society there should be a certain degree of 
solidarity for the disadvantaged segments of society.  
 
Chart 29 
Continuing with a specific question on the unemployment assistance in Albania, a large 
majority of respondents (83 percent) answered that the current allocated sum per household 
was too small. The other two options ─ where the unemployment assistance is stated as high 
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The chart below visualizes respondents’ answers about a list of statements in relation to 
what the Albania state should provide to different categories of people in Albania. In all of 
the statements, the vast majority of respondents fully agree with the statements which are 
mainly indicating a proactive role of the state in securing assistance and social protection to 
different social categories. 
However, while the percentages of disagreement with the statements are insignificant, the 
level of full agreement and partial agreement is more interesting to be discussed. The 
statements that reported a higher degree of ‘partial agreement’ ─ although still low 
compared to the full agreement ─ were that the state should “ensure sufficient child care 
services for working parents” and that the state should “ensure a job for everyone who wants 
one”, where 26 percent and 22 percent of respondents respectively indicated that they 
partially agree with the statement. On the other hand, the statements that were largely agreed 
with by around 90 percent of respondents were that the state should “ensure adequate health 
care for the sick” and that the state should provide “financial assistance to people with 
disability”. 89 percent and 91 percent of citizens respectively fully agreed with these 
statements. It looks like citizens are more sensitive when it comes to those social categories 
that are perceived as more at risk and less able to provide services for themselves.  
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The chart below visualizes respondents’ answers about a list of 
statements in relation to what the Albania state should provide to 
different categories of people in Albania. In all of the statements, 
the vast majority of respondents fully agree with the statements 
which are mainly indicating a proactive role of the state in securing 
assistance and social protection to different social categories.
However, while the percentages of disagreement with the 
statements are insignificant, the level of full agreement and 
partial agreement is more interesting to be discussed. The 
statements that reported a higher degree of ‘partial agreement’ ─ 
although still low compared to the full agreement ─ were that the 
state should “ensure sufficient child care services for working 
parents” and that the state should “ensure a job for everyone 
who wants one”, where 26 percent and 22 percent of respondents 
respectively indicated that they partially agree with the statement. 
On the other hand, the statements that were largely agreed with 
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Chart 31 
When specifically asked about the degree of engagement of the state in redistribution 
policies, the majority of respondents (43 percent) answered that the Albanian state should 
“have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap”. Another 35 percent 
answered that the state should “moderately engage in redistribution policies”; while 12 
percent answered that “the rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”. 
Accordingly, although to different degrees, most of respondents expect the state to have an 
active redistribution role. 
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by around 90 percent of respondents were that the state should 
“ensure adequate health care for the sick” and that the state 
should provide “financial assistance to people with disability”. 
89 percent and 91 percent of citizens respectively fully agreed 
with these statements. It looks like citizens are more sensitive 
when it comes to those social categories that are perceived as 
more at risk and less able to provide services for themselves. 
When specifically asked about the degree of engagement of the 
state in redistribution policies, the majority of respondents (43 
percent) answered that the Albanian state should “have an active 
redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap”. Another 35 
percent answered that the state should “moderately engage in 
redistribution policies”; while 12 percent answered that “the 
rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing with”. 
Accordingly, although to different degrees, most of respondents 
expect the state to have an active redistribution role.
Chart 32
Variation in terms of income and ideological profile 
When it comes to the state role in redistribution policies, from 
chart 32.1, it can be noticed that there is considerable variation in 
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terms of income. Thus, with the increase of incomes respondents 
tend to agree less that the Albanian state should “have an active 
redistribution role in lowering the rich-poor gap” (51 percent of 
respondents in the ‘0-30.000 Lekë’ income range agree against 
29 percent of respondents in the ‘over 160.000 Lekë’ range). On 
the other hand, with the increase of incomes respondents tend to 
agree more that the Albanian state should “moderately engage 
in redistribution policies” and that “the rich-poor gap is not a 
matter the state should be dealing with”. This was expected to be 
a sensitive question in relation to the level of income. 
Chart 32.1
When it comes to the ideological profile, there is some variation 
worth noticing. Thus, when moving from the left side of the 
political spectrum to the right side, respondents tend to agree less 
that the Albanian state should “have an active redistribution role 
in lowering the rich-poor gap”, but the trend is reversed when it 
comes to the statement that “the rich-poor gap is not a matter the 
state should be dealing with”, where central right and right wing 
respondents tend to support this last statement more than the rest 
of the spectrum, although this is still their least preferred option 
in terms of percentage compared to the other two. 
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Section VI: RISK ASSESSMENT
This concluding section evaluates citizens’ perceived major 
problems for Albanians today and for themselves. Apart from the 
horizontal comparison within the chapter in between what citizens 
perceive as other fellow Albanians’ main problems and their own 
problems, the chapter also serves as a good basis to compare 
vertically with other chapters in order to evaluate citizens’ major 
discontents and their approach towards institutions, trust, social 
services provision, the role of the state, etc. 
Citizens were first asked about what they considered to be 
a problem for Albanian citizens currently. It is important to 
notice that in this question, citizens could choose more than one 
option. A vast majority of respondents (87 percent) indicated 
unemployment as a problem for Albanians today, followed by 
Chart 33
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and for themselves. Apart from the horizontal comparison within the chapter in between 
what citizens perceive as other fellow Albanians’ main problems and their own problems, 
the chapter also serves as a good basis to compare vertically with other chapters in order to 
evaluate citizens’ major discontents and their approach towards institutions, trust, social 
services provision, the role of the state, etc.  
Citizens were first asked about what they co sidered to be a problem for Albanian citizens 
currently. It is important to notice that in this question, citizens could choose more than one 
option. A vast majority of respondents (87 percent) indicated unemployment as a problem 
for Albanians today, followed by poverty with 75 percent. Around half of respondents 
indicated the poor standards of justice (53 percent), the poor standards of health care (48 
percent) and crime, violence and/or trafficking (45 percent) as the problems of Albanians 
today. The low level of education, gambling games/casinos, lack of public order/safety and 
vi lation of human rights wer  indicated as problems by around 1/3 of respondents each. 
Around 20-25 percent of respondents saw poor infrastructure, poor business opportunities, 
lack of social solidarity and ineffective police as a problem. Moreover, 12 percent of 
respondents indicated lack of freedom as a problem.  
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When it comes to indicating the most concerning personal issue, there is a certain 
consistency of what are perceived as general problems of Albanian citizens with what 
citizens think as their own major problem. Thus, the three major indicated problems ─ low 
economic income with 29 percent, unemployment with 22 percent and poverty with 12 
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poverty with 75 percent. Around half of respondents indicated 
the poor standards of justice (53 percent), the poor standards of 
health care (48 percent) and crime, violence and/or trafficking 
(45 percent) as the problems of Albanians today. The low level 
of education, gambling games/casinos, lack of public order/
safety and violation of human rights were indicated as problems 
by around 1/3 of respondents each. Around 20-25 percent of 
respondents saw poor infrastructure, poor business opportunities, 
lack of social solidarity and ineffective police as a problem. 
Moreover, 12 percent of respondents indicated lack of freedom 
as a problem. 
When it comes to indicating the most concerning personal issue, 
there is a certain consistency of what are perceived as general 
problems of Albanian citizens with what citizens think as their 
own major problem. Thus, the three major indicated problems ─ 
low economic income with 29 percent, unemployment with 22 
percent and poverty with 12 percent ─ are very similar to what 
they see as other fellow Albanians problems. Moreover, other 
Chart 34
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percent ─ are very similar to what they see as other fellow Albanians problems. Moreover, 
other indicated problems that mostly concerned respondents with 5-7 percent of indications 
were work safety, high rates of crime and/or lack of security, poor standards of health care 
and property issues.  
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If the above results from this years’ survey are compared with the 2013 survey we see an 
almost identical picture of respondents’ major perceived problem. Thus, low income, with 
28 percent; unemployment, with 25 percent; and poverty, with 13 percent are the main 
indicated problems, followed by crime rate and job security.  
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indicated problems that mostly concerned respondents with 5-7 
percent of indications were work safety, high rates of crime and/
or lack of security, poor standards of health care and property 
issues. 
If the above results from this years’ survey are compared with the 
2013 survey we see an almost identical picture of respondents’ 
major perceived problem. Thus, low income, with 28 percent; 
unemployment, with 25 percent; and poverty, with 13 percent 
are the main indicated problems, followed by crime rate and job 
security. 
Chart 3523
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Appendix1: Questionnaire
I. GENERAL PROFILE
1. Gender
1 Male    2 Female
2. What is your age?
a. 18- 29
b. 30 -39
c. 40-49
d. 50-69
e. Over 70
3. What is your level of education?
a. No education
b. Elementary School
c. High School
d. University education
e. Master
f. PhD
4. What is your household level of income:
a. 0- 30.000 ALL
b. 30.001- 60.000 ALL
c. 60.001- 100.000 ALL
d. 100.001- 160.000 ALL
e. Above 160.000 ALL
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5. What is your employment status:
a. Employed
b. Self employed
c. Unemployed
d. Student
e. Pensioner
f. No answer
6. How would you define your ideological profile:
1 Left
2 Central left
3 Centre
4 Central right
5 Right
6 None
99 No answer
II. DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ECONOMY  
7. How would you assess the level of democracy in Albania 
today? (Check only one alternative)
1 Albania is a fully non-democratic country
2 Albania is more non-democratic than democratic
3 Albania is more democratic than non-democratic
4 Albania is a fully democratic country
99 Don’t know / No answer
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8. Would you say that market economy is the right economic 
system for Albanians?: (Check only one alternative)
1. Yes    0. No             99. Don’t know
9.  In your opinion (Answer with Yes or No):
1. The Albanian state should intervene in economy in defining 
prices, protecting certain strategic businesses, etc.
2. The Albanian state should regulate economic relations, general 
competition rules and trade.
The Albanian state should intervene and be present as little as 
possible in the economy as market economy regulates itself 
10. Decisions on public services management and priorities 
should be responsibility of (Check only one answer):
1 Only experts and policy makers who deal with public services management 
and know better
2 Both experts/policymakers and the general public or community groups 
which benefit and contribute for these services
3 Community and general public should be much more involved in shaping 
these services while indicating priorities to policymakers. 
11. How much influence do you have in shaping decisions on 
public services:
1. A lot 2. Somehow 3. Little 4. None
Local level
National level
ALBANIANS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL
88
12.  Do you agree with the following statements?
1. Yes 0. No 99. Don’t 
know
The judicial system in Albania giver 
fair decisions 
Citizens should have personal 
connections in order to get a fair 
judgment 
Citizens should have political 
connections in order to get a fair judgment
Citizens should pay bribes/corrupt 
judges/ prosecutors in order to get a fair 
judgment 
13. To what extent do you agree with the following statements 
(check only one alternative per statement):
4. Fully 
agree
3. Some-
how
2. Little 1. Not at 
all
99. Don’t 
know/no 
answer
The Albanian state is 
functioning properly 
nowadays 
The Albanian state 
is present in all the 
Albanian territory
Law enforcement is 
present in all Albanian 
territory
The  Albanian state 
respects human rights 
The Albanian state is 
providing basic public 
goods to its citizens 
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III. TRUST
14. Below is a list of institutions in Albania. How much trust 
do you have in each of them? (check only one alternative per 
institution):
1. A lot 2. Some-
how
3. Little 4. None 99. Don’t 
know/no 
answer
1. President
2. Government
3. Prime Minister
4. Opposition 
5. General attorney 
6. Police
7. Political parties
8. Courts
9. Private education 
institutions 
10. Public education 
institutions 
11. Private hospitals
12. Public hospitals
13. Central Election 
Commission 
14. Civil Society 
15. Media
16. Religious 
institutions 
17. Army 
18. Intelligence 
services
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IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE
15. Important decisions on wages, working hours and workers 
rights in Albania (Check only one alternative):
1 Should be exclusively discussed and decided only by public institutions and 
government/policymakers 
2 Should be discussed and decided by the government/policymakers in 
collaboration with the trade unions
3 Should be mainly discussed and decided by trade unions while the 
government/policymakers are the endpoint 
99 Don’t know
16. Trade unions in Albania nowadays are:
1. Yes 0. No 99. Don’t know
1. Nonexistent
2. Existent but ineffective in 
supporting workers rights
3. Active and effective in 
supporting workers rights
4. Not independent from 
political parties or other fractions
V. PUBLIC SERVICES AND STATE SIZE
17. In your opinion who should be the main provider of these 
services:
1 State 2 Private 
entities
3 Others (family, 
community, 
NGOs)
Jobs
Education
Health Care
Social protection/services
Towards a redefinition of the social contract
91
Justice
Public safety
Infrastructure
Housing 
Water supply
Electricity
Communication/ Post 
office
Equal opportunity 
Other (specify) 
18. In your opinion education in Albania should be (Check 
only one alternative):
1. Public and funded by general taxation
2. Public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users fees
3. Publicly funded but managed by private organizations
4. Privatized and paid for directly by citizens when using it
99.  Don’t know
19. In your opinion health care in Albania should be (Check 
only one alternative):
1. Public and funded by general taxation
2. Public and funded partly by taxes and partly by users fees
3. Publicly funded but managed by private organizations
4. Privatized and paid for directly by citizens when using it
99.  Don’t know
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20. In your opinion pensions in Albania should be (Check 
only one alternative):
1. Publicly managed and funded by social contributions as they 
currently are
2. Publicly managed and funded by social contributions, but 
allowing those who choose to do so to devote part of the 
contributions to a private fund
3. They should be fully working on private schemes and 
contributions
99. Don’t know
21. Are you satisfied with the standards of  the following 
public services provided  by the state in Albania (Check only 
one alternative per service):  
4. Very 
satisfied
3.    
Satisfied  
2. Not 
very 
satisfied
1. No 
satisfied
99. Don’t 
know/no 
answer
Education
Health Care
Justice
Security 
Infrastructure
Water supply
Electricity
Pensions
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Employment 
promotion 
Business affairs 
(registration, 
taxation 
authorities, 
competitiveness)
Consumer 
protection
Human rights 
protection 
(protection of 
vulnerable groups/ 
minorities/ from 
discrimination)
Waste 
management
22. Who provides a better quality of the following services?
1 Public 
institutions
2 Private sector 99 Don’t know
Education
Health Care
Justice 
Security 
Employment 
promotion
Pensions
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23. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
YES NO
All state enterprises in Albania should be privatized
Privatization makes state enterprises more effective in 
providing services
The Albanian state should contract managing private 
companies without giving up state ownership over state 
enterprises
No privatization process of any kind should be 
applied for any state enterprise ownership or service 
management
24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
YES NO
1. The level of taxes should increase if this would bring 
to better services
2. The level of taxes should decrease as I am willing  to 
privately provide services for myself and family 
3. I would be willing to contribute with non financial
means (volunteering, community services, etc)
4. Who earns more should pay more
5. Income taxes should have a fixed rate 
despite the level of incomes 
VI. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
25. In a fair society  (Check only one alternative):
1. Everyone is rewarded in wealth in accordance to talent and 
contribution
2. Who pays more gets more, but certain disadvantaged segments 
of society should be assisted by the state 
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3. No one is left without basic public services despite their 
ability to contribute 
    99.  Don’t know/ No answer 
26. How do you evaluate unemployment benefits currently in 
Albania? (Check only one alternative):
1. The allocated sum per household is too low
2. The allocated sum per household is too high
3. The allocated sum per household is just about right
99.  Don’t know/ No answer 
27. How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:
The Albanian state should provide: Fully 
agree
Partially 
agree 
Not at 
all
1 An adequate retirement income in old age
2 Financial assistance during periods of  
unemployment
3 Financial assistance to poor families
4 Financial assistance to people with 
disability
5 Ensure a job for everyone who wants one
6 Ensure adequate health care for the sick
7 Ensure sufficient child care services for 
working parents
8 Provide paid maternity leave
9 Provide specific quotas and opportunities 
for disadvantaged groups in society (roma, 
women, ect)
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28.  The Albanian state (Check only one alternative):
1. Should have an active redistribution role in lowering the rich-
poor gap 
2. Should moderately engage in redistribution policies 
3. The rich-poor gap is not a matter the state should be dealing 
with 
99. Don’t know
VII. RICK ASSESSMENT 
29.  Which of the following do you consider to be a problem 
for Albanian citizens today? (Check all that apply):
1. Unemployment 
2. Poverty
3. Lack of public order/security
4. Ineffective police
5. Low level of education
6. Poor standards of Justice
7. Violation of human rights
8. Poor  standards on health care
9. Crime/violence/trafficking
10. No Freedom
11. Environmental degradation 
12. Illegal Business/Poor business opportunity
13. Gambling 
14. Poor standards of roads 
15. Lack of social solidarity 
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16. Other ( specify)
17. There  are no problems for  citizens
99.  Don’t know/ No answer 
30. What is your most concerning personal issue? (Check 
only one alternative)
1. Low economic income
2. Poverty
3. Unemployment
4. Job insecurity
5. Poor standards of education
6. Poor standards of health care
7. Lack of social services 
8. High rate of crime/security 
9. Environmental damage/ Pollution
10. Housing 
11. Property issue
12. No problem at all
99. Don’t know/ No answer
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